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CASE COMMENTARIES
ANTITRUST
Internet service providers are not liable under anti-competition statutes for 
controlling prices when they owe no duty to competing providers. Pac. Bell Tel. 
Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109 (2009). 
By Coleton Bragg 
Customers throughout the United States pay an Internet service provider 
(“ISP”) for internet access through various mediums and at differing speeds.  One 
method for accessing the Internet occurs via a digital subscriber line (“DSL”), where 
an ISP provides customers high-speed internet access over telephone lines.  This 
method requires an ISP to own, or have access to, the needed telephone wires that 
make DSL internet service possible.  In most locations, only one incumbent ISP 
actually owns the required telephone lines and infrastructure, and this poses a 
problem for competing ISPs.  Because non-incumbent ISPs also need access to the 
telephone lines to provide their customers DSL internet service, the non-incumbent 
ISPs are forced to pay a fee to the incumbent ISPs.  This industry structure allows 
the incumbent ISP to control both the retail price it charges its own DSL customers 
and a portion of  the cost incurred by its competitors (the non-incumbent ISPs) in 
their efforts to provide DSL service to customers. 
Not surprisingly, some have questioned whether this industry arrangement 
harms competition due to the fact that incumbent ISPs can price-squeeze their non-
incumbent ISP competitors.  Section 2 of  the Sherman Act of  1890 makes it 
unlawful to “monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with 
any other person or persons to monopolize any part of  the trade or commerce . . . .”  
In Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. Linkline Communications, Inc., the United States Supreme 
Court addressed whether the Sherman Act had been violated where an incumbent 
ISP had no antitrust obligation to rent its telephone lines to a non-incumbent ISP 
competitor, and where the incumbent ISP allegedly price-squeezed its non-
incumbent ISP competitors.  Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the incumbent 
ISP had not violated the Sherman Act because it had no antitrust duty toward its 
non-incumbent ISP competitor. 
Pacific Bell Telephone Company (“AT&T”) owned “much of  the 
infrastructure and facilities needed to provide DSL service in California” and 
controlled the telephone lines that “connect homes and businesses to the telephone 
network.”  As described above, to serve their customers DSL, competing ISPs had to 
obtain access to AT&T’s telephone lines.  The plaintiff, Linkline Communications, 
Inc. (“Linkline”), consisted of  four independent ISPs that compete with AT&T in 
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the retail DSL market.  Linkline did not own the required telephone lines and leased 
the required infrastructure from AT&T to provide DSL services to customers.  Thus, 
AT&T served as an ISP to its customers and as a gatekeeper to the infrastructure 
Linkline needed for its customers. 
Linkline filed suit against AT&T in July 2003, alleging that AT&T violated § 
2 of  the Sherman Act “by monopolizing the DSL market in California.”  Linkline 
stated in its complaint that AT&T “refused to deal with the plaintiffs [Linkline], 
denied the plaintiffs access to essential facilities, and engaged in a ‘price squeeze,’” 
thus affecting Linkline’s profit margins “by setting a high wholesale price for DSL 
transport and a low retail price for DSL Internet service.” 
The United States Supreme Court previously had held in Verizon 
Communications, Inc., v. Law Offices of  Curtis V. Trinko1 “that a firm with no antitrust 
duty to deal with its rivals at all is under no obligation to provide those rivals with a 
‘sufficient’ level of  service.”  Based on this ruling, AT&T moved for summary 
judgment, arguing that Trinko was applicable.  The district court agreed, holding that 
AT&T had no antitrust duty to deal with Linkline.  However, the district court 
denied, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, AT&T’s motion to dismiss in regard to the 
price-squeeze claims because Trinko did not address this issue. 
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court followed its reasoning in Trinko,
holding that AT&T did not violate § 2 of  the Sherman Act because AT&T had “no 
antitrust duty to deal with its rivals at wholesale.”  The Supreme Court reasoned that 
AT&T did not “attempt or conspire to monopolize” the DSL Market when 
comparing the facts of  the case before it to the situation in Trinko.  Similar to 
AT&T’s business model, in Trinko Verizon Communications, Inc. (“Verizon”) leased 
portions of  its network to competing firms at wholesale rates. 
The AT&T court noted that Verizon’s competitors then alleged in their 
complaint that Verizon’s “insufficient assistance” violated the Sherman Act “by 
impeding the ability of  independent carriers to compete in the downstream market 
for local telephone service.”  The Supreme Court held in that decision that the 
Sherman Act had not been violated because Verizon had no antitrust duty to deal 
with its competitors at the wholesale level, and therefore had no duty to deal with 
them under terms and conditions that the rivals find commercially advantageous. 
Trinko does not specifically address Linkline’s price-squeeze claim; however, 
the Supreme Court reasoned that this was a moot point in the current case because 
AT&T owed Linkline no antitrust duty, and because Linkline did not provide 
evidential support for a predatory-price claim.  Linkline’s price-squeeze claim would 
require that AT&T keep the prices it charged its DSL customers too low.  Linkline 
1 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
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would have to show that AT&T’s prices were set at a rate below Linkline’s costs, and 
that AT&T would be able “to recoup its ‘investment’ in below-cost prices.”  
Linkline’s complaint did not show that either of  those requirements had been met. 
The Supreme Court’s decision to reverse the Court of  Appeals and hold 
AT&T innocent of  violating § 2 of  the Sherman Act reflects the high hurdles that 
must be met for a party to be found monopolizing an industry.  The Sherman Act 
protects competition, and the courts, when analyzing both this case and prior 
precedent, are slow to make decisions that might have the opposite effect.  Although 
it appears that the ISP industry structure gives an unfair advantage to the incumbent 
ISPs because they can affect their non-incumbent ISP competitors’ profit margins, 
the courts want to ensure that a duty exists under the Sherman Act before imposing 
additional restraints on competition. 
In addition, because the Sherman Act provides a high hurdle, sufficient 
evidence needs to be provided to succeed on a predatory-pricing claim.  Future 
petitioners need to make sure they can prove that the rates incumbents charge are set 
below their own costs when the incumbent is returning profits.  Therefore, it is 
imperative for transactional attorneys to determine whether a duty exists when 
advising clients on issues involving the Sherman Act. 
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
In order to breach the fiduciary duty of  loyalty during a sale of  a corporation, 
directors must demonstrate bad faith in failing to fulfill their duty to 
maximize the sale price for shareholders. Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235 
(Del. 2009).
By Kristopher Frye
When shareholders bring a class-action lawsuit against a corporation and its 
directors, alleging they failed to exercise good faith in the sale of  the company, the 
outcome is determined by measuring the conduct of  the directors against well-
settled legal principles of  what constitutes bad faith.  In the absence of  bad faith, 
which is defined as a knowing disregard of  fiduciary duties, the shareholders cannot 
prevail simply by alleging that the directors failed to take every possible step to 
achieve a higher sale price.  The Delaware Supreme Court was confronted with this 
issue in Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan and held that during the sale of  a corporation, 
Delaware corporate directors must demonstrate bad faith in failing to fulfill their sole 
duty under Revlon2 – to maximize the sale price for shareholders – in order to breach 
2 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
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the fiduciary duty of  loyalty. 
In Lyondell, shareholders brought suit alleging that the directors of  Lyondell 
Chemical Company (“Lyondell”) failed to act in good faith while effecting a sale of  
the company to Basell AF (“Basell”).  Prior to the sale of  Lyondell to Basell, 
Lyondell was the third-largest publicly traded chemical company in North America.  
During the summer of  2006, Basell offered to purchase Lyondell for a price a 
$26.50-28.50 per share.  The Lyondell board rejected this offer as too low.  Over the 
next year, Lyondell continued to prosper, but no other companies expressed interest 
in purchasing it.  Then, in May 2007 Basell filed a Schedule 13D (“Schedule”) with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission disclosing its right to acquire an 8.3-
percent block of  Lyondell stock.  According to the Lyondell board, this filing 
signaled to the market that Lyondell was “in play,” and in response the board called a 
special meeting.  At the meeting, the board decided the company would adopt a 
“wait and see” approach, rather than actively solicit offers for a sale. 
On July 9, 2007, Basell’s owner, Leonard Blatvanik (“Blatvanik”), met with 
Lyondell’s Chairman and CEO, Dan Smith (“Smith”), to discuss an all-cash deal at 
$40 per share.  Smith suggested that the offer was too low, and Blatvanik responded 
with an offer of  $44-45 per share.  Smith still did not believe this offer was high 
enough to win the support of  the Lyondell board, but nonetheless offered to present 
it to them.  Smith spoke to Blatvanik again later that day, and Blatvanik raised the 
offer to $48 per share on the condition that Lyondell pay a $400 million break-up fee 
and complete the sale by July 16, 2007. 
The next day, Smith called a meeting of  the board to consider Basell’s offer.  
The meeting concluded in less than an hour with the board requesting a written offer 
from Basell with more details about Basell’s financing.  Blatvanik agreed to the 
request, but demanded that Lyondell give Basell until July 11 to make a higher offer 
for Huntsman Corporation (“Huntsman”), another company Basell had offered to 
purchase.  At Lyondell’s board meeting on July 11, the board weighed Basell’s offer 
and then authorized Smith to negotiate with Blatvanik.  That same day, Basell 
announced it was no longer pursuing the merger with Huntsman and from July 12-
15, the parties negotiated the terms of  a merger agreement. 
Smith was instructed to negotiate for a higher sale price, a provision that 
would allow Lyondell to shop for better offers, and a reduced break-up fee.  Smith, 
however, only succeeded on reducing the break-up fee from $400 down to $385 
million.  On July 16, the deadline for completing the merger, the board met to 
consider the agreement.  After weighing financial projections that suggested the offer 
price was fair, and considering the lack of  any other offers at the time, the board 
voted to approve the merger and recommend it to the shareholders.  At a special 
shareholders’ meeting on November 20, 2007, the merger was approved by more 
than 99 percent of  the voted shares. 
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The issue here is whether the Lyondell board breached its fiduciary duty of  
loyalty by failing to act in good faith.  In this interlocutory appeal, the Delaware 
Supreme Court reviewed de novo the trial court’s decision to deny Lyondell summary 
judgment.  The Court examined the history of  its good-faith jurisprudence and 
concluded that the Stone v. Ritter3 test was controlling.  In Stone, the Delaware 
Supreme Court held that “imposition of  liability requires a showing that the 
directors knew that they were not discharging their fiduciary obligations.”4
The trial court denied summary judgment on the basis that it needed a more 
complete record before deciding on this issue.  The Supreme Court, however, 
reversed the decision of  the trial court, based on three critical errors in its analysis.  
First, the trial court imposed Revlon duties on the Lyondell directors after the filing 
of  the Schedule, but before they decided to sell or before the sale had become 
inevitable.  Second, the trial court mistakenly read Revlon as creating a specific set of  
requirements, such as conducting a market check or auction, before a sale can 
proceed.  Third, the trial court erred when it equated an imperfect attempt by 
Lyondell to fulfill its Revlon duties with bad faith, as defined in Stone.
According to Revlon, the only duty is to “get the best price for the 
stockholders at a sale of  the company.”5 The trial court erroneously focused on the 
time between the Schedule filing in May 2007 and the week of  July 10, 2007, when 
Basell’s merger offer was formalized. Admittedly, the directors did very little to 
effectuate a sale of  the company during this period, but that does not necessarily 
constitute bad faith. According to the court, Revlon duties did not arise with the filing 
of  the Schedule. Following the board meeting on July 10 when the merger was 
proposed, however, Revlon imposed a duty on the directors to maximize the sale price 
of  the company. 
The record showed that the directors met several times and attempted to 
negotiate better terms for the deal.  The Court held that even on the limited record, 
there was sufficient evidence to show that the Lyondell directors did not knowingly 
disregard their fiduciary duties under Revlon, and thus were entitled to summary 
judgment.  The Court noted that if  the standard was due care rather than bad faith, 
the outcome may have been different.  Under a due care standard, the shareholders 
would need only to show that the Lyondell directors failed to do everything they 
could to achieve a higher sale price.  The controlling standard, however, is bad faith, 
which requires the directors to knowingly and completely fail to do all they could. 
The holding in Lyondell is notable because the repercussions of  a contrary 
3 Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). 
4 Id. at 370. 
5Id. at 182.
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holding would be severe and far-reaching.  It appears that the directors of  Lyondell 
were presented with an exceptional offer.  Plaintiff  shareholders sought to invalidate 
what could be characterized as a “blowout” sale price, on the basis that for two 
months before the offer was tendered, the board did not actively solicit offers or 
conduct an auction or market check for the potential sale of  the company during the 
week the merger negotiations were underway.  Fortunately for the directors, the 
Court refused to impose such an inflexible and unreasonable burden. 
Given the inherent difficulty in proving the intentional element of  bad faith, 
transactional attorneys should feel confident in advising their corporate clients that 
they have satisfied their fiduciary duties when they have achieved the best possible 
sale price for the company and have not acted in a way that represents a purposeful 
disregard for one’s fiduciary duties.  Of  course, securing the best possible sale price 
does require due diligence and an adherence to the directors’ fiduciary duties.  So 
while a court may be willing to accept something better than “utter failure” on the 
part of  directors, shareholders may not be so forgiving.  Therefore, it is advisable to 
provide shareholders with evidence that the board did work to achieve the best price. 
Vicarious responsibility is imputed to each partner in a joint venture, which 
may release third parties from obligations to an individual partner. Phelps v. 
Bank of  America, No. M2007-02135-COA-R3-CV, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 260, 2009 
WL 690695 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2009).
By Stephen Quinn 
A joint venture is a limited-purpose partnership where at least two people 
combine resources to pursue a common purpose and share profits, each with an 
equal right of  control.  As a type of  partnership, unless otherwise provided, third-
party dealings with a partner acting on behalf  of  the joint venture are treated as 
interactions with an agent of  the joint venture, effectively binding the other partner.  
In Phelps v. Bank of  America, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals held that an agreement 
between a contractor and construction financier was a joint venture; therefore, a 
bank’s loan disbursement to the contractor on behalf  of  the property owner was a 
payment to the joint venture, relinquishing it from any claims against it by the 
financier.
A Nashville property owner, Joseph Angus sought to construct a duplex on 
his property but lacked financing.  Angus solicited Bank of  America for a 
construction loan.  The bank declined to finance the construction, but informed 
Angus that it would provide a loan once improvements on the property were made 
and an appraisal was performed.  Angus hired William Church, owner of  C&C 
Construction, to construct the building.  Church enlisted a former business partner, 
Wade Lee Phelps, to finance the duplex construction.  Angus and Church signed a 
construction contract, which included a financing addendum signed by the Angus, 
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Church, and Phelps.  Separately, Phelps entered into an agreement with Church to 
construct the duplex building.  This agreement described the arrangement between 
Phelps and Church as a “joint venture,” where both parties would evenly share in any 
profits realized at closing. 
Following construction and appraisal, the bank, Angus, and Church attended 
the loan closing.  At the closing proceedings, the bank disbursed Angus’s loan to 
Church for the construction costs. Church, however, retained the construction 
payment for himself  and withheld payment to Phelps.  Subsequently, Phelps sued the 
bank for negligence and breach of  contract in releasing the loan payment to Church.  
The trial court granted summary judgment to the bank, finding that the agreement 
between Phelps and Church was a joint venture.  Therefore, the bank’s payment to 
Church constituted a payment to the joint venture, precluding Phelps from asserting 
claims against the bank based on its alleged failure to pay him. 
On appeal, Phelps asserted that the trial court erred in concluding that its 
finding of  a joint venture released the bank from an obligation to pay him the loan 
proceeds.  Phelps principally relied on statements made in a conversation with a bank 
employee assuring him that he would be paid at closing.  Phelps also suggested that 
the different responsibilities between Church and himself  – construction and 
financing, respectively – prevented a finding of  equal control, which is a necessary 
element in establishing a joint venture. 
The Tennessee Court of  Appeals affirmed the decision of  the trial court, 
dismissing the claims against the bank.  The Court upheld the trial court’s finding of  
a joint venture between Phelps and Church.  The finding of  a joint venture, coupled 
with the absence of  privity of  contract between the bank and Phelps, effectively 
negated the duty element necessary to support Phelps’s negligence claim. 
In finding a joint venture, the Court relied on the evidence of  a signed 
agreement between Phelps and Church, which specifically described their common-
purpose business arrangement in the construction project as a “joint venture,” and 
included an equal profit sharing provision.  The Court found Phelps’s evidence of  a 
division in the work responsibilities (construction and financing) to actually support 
a finding of  a joint venture because it indicated “that each had an equal right to 
control the venture, [and] exercised that control for the benefit of  the enterprise and 
agreed to the division of  responsibilities.”  The Court also dismissed Phelps’s 
attempt to rely on alleged oral promises by a bank employee because the Tennessee 
Statute of  Frauds specifically prevents a party from taking action against a lender or 
creditor in the absence of  a signed writing. 
The Court then explained that a joint venture functions as a type of  
partnership.  Section 61-31-301(1) of  the Tennessee Code provides that “[e]ach 
partner is an agent of  the partnership for the purposes of  its business.”  The statute 
continues: “[a]n act of  a partner, [acting within the scope of  the partnership], binds 
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the partnership.”  Therefore, the bank’s payment to Church, and his receipt of  the 
funds, represented a payment to the joint venture.  As a result, the Court concluded 
that Phelps failed to show why the bank would be liable for Church’s subsequent 
failure to pay him and affirmed summary judgment for the bank. 
The Tennessee Court of  Appeal’s decision in Phelps v. Bank of  America serves 
as a reminder of  the potentially damaging implications of  the vicarious responsibility 
that accompanies a joint venture business arrangement.  A partner to a joint venture 
is fully bound by the actions of  the other partner in dealing with third parties unless 
the third party receives notice that the partner lacks the authority to act on behalf  of  
the joint venture.  The decision also emphasizes the importance of  converting oral 
assurances into signed writings, particularly in dealing with a lender or creditor.  
Attorneys that represent partners in joint ventures should advise their clients of  the 
vicarious responsibility risks that accompany joint ventures and encourage such 
clients to carve out express provisions for dealing with third parties on behalf  of  the 
joint venture. 
Where a partnership agreement requires all partners to consent to a 
contribution as a capital contribution before it is considered a capital 
contribution, evidence of the other partners’ consent must be present to 
receive such treatment. Braden v. Strong, No. M2008-00216-COA-R3-CV, 2009 
Tenn. App. LEXIS 54, 2009 WL 276737 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2009). 
By Joe Watson 
There are times when an owner, partner, or shareholder provides capital to a 
business in the form of cash or property.  If these contributions are treated as capital 
contributions, the contributor’s interest in the business increases.  In a partnership 
setting, this interest represents the share of the business that each partner owns, and 
the capital accounts track the amount of contributions by and distributions to the 
partners.  To receive capital contribution treatment, many partnership agreements 
require all partners to agree that the contribution is a capital contribution, and that 
the respective interests of the partners will change. 
In Braden v. Strong, the Tennessee Court of Appeals addressed the issue of 
when a partner makes a contribution without expressly receiving consent from other 
partners that it is a capital contribution, and that partner argues that implied consent 
was given.  The court held that where a partnership agreement requires consent that 
a contribution will be treated as a capital contribution, evidence of the other 
partners’ consent must be present before capital account adjustments are made. 
In Braden, Paul Braden (“Braden”) and Nancy Strong (“Strong”) were 
partners in the Landscaping Concepts Partnership (“LCP”).  The partnership 
agreement stipulated that any money contributed by either partner that was 
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consented to as a capital contribution would be credited to the partner’s respective 
capital account.  At some point during the partnership, Braden contributed an 
unspecified amount of money to the partnership.  The partners never discussed 
whether the money would be treated as a capital contribution, and thus did not 
address whether the capital accounts or percentages of ownership would be altered.  
In addition, the capital accounts, as evidenced by federal tax returns, remained 
unchanged in 2005 after Braden had filed an action seeking capital account 
adjustments.  When Braden later moved to dissolve the partnership, the 
circumstances were ripe for disagreement concerning the respective interests in LCP. 
Braden initially filed suit seeking to dissolve the partnership, but also sought 
an accounting to determine the proper interests of the partners.  The trial court ruled 
in favor of Braden and awarded him an increase in his capital account.  On first 
appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the ruling to 
determine whether Strong consented to capital contributions by Braden, as required 
by the terms of the partnership agreement.  On remand, the trial court acknowledged 
that Strong did not give express consent to Braden’s capital contributions, but held 
that she provided implied consent.  Because of this implied consent finding, the 
court increased Braden’s capital accounts by $261,361.84.  Following this holding, 
Strong filed a second appeal. 
Strong presented several issues in the second appeal: (1) whether the trial 
court erred in awarding Braden capital account adjustments; (2) whether the court 
should have allowed expanded accounting of other accounts and entities; (3) whether 
Braden breached his fiduciary duty and the partnership agreement; and (4) whether 
Strong should have been required to pay 51% of the accounting costs.  However, for 
all of the issues other than the capital accounts adjustment, the Tennessee Court of 
Appeals simply deferred to the trial court’s discretion without providing any 
substantial analysis.  Thus, the only issue addressed was the capital contributions 
matter and whether Strong consented to such contributions. 
According to the court, the capital accounts issue depended upon the 
determination of whether Strong consented to the capital contributions by Braden.  
In the first appeal, the court decided the legal contractual interpretation issue by 
holding that the partnership agreement allowed for capital account adjustments and 
shifts in the percentages of ownership, only if the partners consented to capital 
contributions. Braden v. Strong, No. M2004-02369-COA-R3-CV, 2006 Tenn. App. 
LEXIS 104, at *32, 33, 2006 WL 369274, at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2006).  
Hence, the issue facing the court in the second appeal was a factual one: whether 
Strong consented to Braden’s infusion of cash as a capital contribution. 
This time, the court reversed the trial court and held that Strong did not 
impliedly consent to capital contributions by Braden.  Both the trial court and 
appellate court agreed that Strong and Braden never discussed capital contributions, 
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and thus, there was no express consent.  The court, however, rejected the trial 
court’s reasoning that a partner’s contribution automatically results in implied 
consent from the other partners that it will be treated as a capital contribution.  The 
court pointed specifically to two factors in concluding that Strong offered no implied 
consent.  First, the partners never talked with each other or their accountant about 
changes in the capital accounts or percentages of ownership; and secondly, the 
partnership’s tax returns did not reflect any change in capital accounts or ownership 
shares, even after Braden had filed a claim for capital account adjustments. 
According to the court, “[t]he mere infusion of cash into a business should 
[not] be deemed a capital contribution.”  The court would not go along with the trial 
court’s argument that the contribution had to come from some source and instead, 
reasoned that the money could have been treated as a loan, rather than a capital 
contribution.  Consequently, the court reversed the trial court’s capital credit award 
and Braden’s accompanying account adjustment. 
The court’s decision in Braden v. Strong gives some teeth to clauses in 
transactional agreements that require consent before money given by a partner will 
be deemed a capital contribution.  For a contributing partner, this opinion illustrates 
that to enjoy capital account credit, garnering some form of consent from the other 
partners is an absolute; simply paying money to the business is not enough.  
Conversely, if another partner contributes money to the business, the other partners 
should not have to worry about their respective ownership interests being affected 
without their consent. 
In these situations, transactional attorneys should advise their clients that 
contributions must be consented to as capital contributions by the other partners 
before such contributions will affect capital accounts and ownership percentages.  
Ideally, partners making contributions to a partnership should obtain express written 
consent to ensure that their capital accounts are accordingly adjusted.  Apart from 
advising clients about this consent requirement regarding capital contributions, 
transactional attorneys should also be aware that these same principles could apply to 
their own practice and the structure of their law firm. 
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Motions to dismiss on the pleadings are increasingly difficult to obtain absent 
an undisputed and clear factual record. Ind. State Dist. Council of  Laborers v. 
Brukardt, No. M2007-00271-COA-R3-CV, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 269, 2009 WL 
426237(Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2009). 
By Merrill Nelson 
To satisfy the liberal pleading requirements under Tennessee law in a civil 
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complaint, a plaintiff  merely needs to assert a short and plain statement showing the 
claimant is entitled to relief.  When addressing a motion to dismiss for failure to state 
a claim, Tennessee courts view the factual allegations within a complaint as true, 
without considering the legal probabilities associated with the ultimate success of  a 
claim.  In Indiana State District Council of  Laborers v. Brukardt, the Tennessee Court of  
Appeals addressed the inherent fallacy in dismissing a complaint on the pleadings 
without first developing a full factual record of  the allegations, holding that the 
alleged facts were sufficient to allow the case to proceed. 
In May 2005, Renal Care Group, Inc. (“Renal Care”) announced a merger 
with Fresenius Medical Care AG (“Fresenius”).  Shortly thereafter, stockholders of  
Renal Care (“Plaintiffs”) filed a shareholder class action complaint against Gary 
Brukardt, President and CEO of  Renal Care, and other board members (collectively, 
“Defendants”), alleging breach of  fiduciary duty and self-dealing.  Specifically, 
Plaintiffs alleged that the merger was sought by Defendants for an improper and 
misleading purpose, breaching their fiduciary duties of  loyalty, due care, and good 
faith, and that their actions resulted in detrimental consequences to the Plaintiffs. 
Upon receipt of  the complaint, Defendants removed the case to federal 
court.  The merger progressed, however, and the stockholders ratified, leading to the 
closing of  the merger in March 2006.  After the case was returned to state court, 
Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on September 13, 2006.  The amended 
complaint detailed the alleged improper actions of  Defendants in seeking and 
procuring the merger with Fresenius.  Several developments in late 2004 allegedly 
moved the Defendants to seek a merger.  First, in October, the Department of  
Justice subpoenaed Renal Care in connection with a Medicare fraud investigation. 
Second, in November, the Securities and Exchange Commission launched an 
investigation into the stock option practices of  various companies.  This 
investigation concerned the Defendants because the company had allegedly engaged 
in the highly improper practice of  backdating stock options for directors on multiple 
occasions.  The Plaintiffs alleged that this information only became available in a 
May 2006 Wall Street Journal article exposing the Defendants’ improper conduct.  
Third, in December, the DOJ confirmed that a business partner of  the Defendants 
had agreed to pay a large settlement resulting from allegations of  fraud against 
government health care programs. 
In the wake of  these developments, the complaint alleged that the 
Defendants had sought a merger to secure stronger indemnity protections against 
shareholder and government litigation.  Furthermore, Defendants quickly identified 
Fresenius as the designated merger partner and allegedly ignored potential conflicts 
of  interests related to both the merger and the two separate investment advisors to 
the Defendants in the deal.  Finally, Plaintiffs charged that the Definitive Proxy 
Statement concerning the Acquisition (“Proxy”) filed with the SEC on July 21, 2005 
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for the company’s shareholders’ use in making a fully informed vote on the merger 
failed to disclose material information about the deal for the purpose of  protecting 
each Defendant’s personal liability. 
The Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint on December 22, 
2006.  The trial court granted the motion on August 30, 2007, orally holding that the 
record, which included the complaint, the Proxy, newspaper articles, and press 
releases, showed that the Defendants had sufficient independence in their 
negotiations.  The record also showed that there was no method that could have 
assessed a potential value to backdated stock options or Medicare fraud issues, 
because they had not yet matured at the time of  the merger. 
Reviewing the dismissal de novo, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals reversed the 
trial court, holding that the complaint alleged sufficient facts to move forward with 
the lawsuit.  The court found both procedural and substantive deficiencies with the 
trial court’s decision.  With limited exceptions, any evidentiary materials outside of  
the pleadings should not be considered on a dismissal motion for failing to state a 
claim.  While the Court of  Appeals determined that the proxy was permissible, the 
trial court’s use of  external press materials was erroneous because the materials were 
neither under judicial notice nor otherwise admissible to consider the truth of  the 
claims.  Consequently, this error “was of  some import in the erroneous granting of  
the motion to dismiss.” 
The court outlined three separate examples of  why the dismissal of  the 
complaint was a misapplication of  current law.  A dismissal motion under Tennessee 
Rule of  Civil Procedure 12.02(6) for failure to state a claim challenges the legal 
sufficiency of  a complaint.  It should only be granted when a plaintiff  can show no 
set of  facts that would entitle them to relief.  Applying this principle, the court first 
examined the allegation of  improper deal protection measures.  While deal 
protection agreements are often proper in corporate mergers, under the controlling 
Delaware law corporate boards are not given complete discretion as to their validity 
if  they are derogatory to shareholders.  Courts must take on a fact-intensive inquiry 
to examine whether deal protection measures were properly undertaken.  The Court 
emphasized the trial court’s failure to engage in such an inquiry. 
Next, the Court addressed the validity of  dismissing allegations because they 
had not matured at the time of  the transaction in question.  Under Delaware law, a 
corporate board has the fiduciary duty to disclose all material facts under its 
knowledge that would significantly impact a broad stockholder vote.  The applicable 
standard for a material fact is one that a reasonable shareholder would find 
important in a voting analysis.  Emphasizing the seriousness of  claims alleging 
backdated stock options and Medicare fraud, as well as the potential criminal and 
civil consequences, the Court of  Appeals determined that the Plaintiffs; alleged facts 
concerning these activities precluded a finding that the failure to disclose 
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information about potential investigations into these activities was not material to 
Renal Care stockholders. 
The final issue addressed was whether the case was barred by the affirmative 
defense of  shareholder ratification.  A Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss based on an 
affirmative defense is rarely sustainable because affirmative defenses often rely on 
factual findings that fall outside the pleadings.  While affirmative defense dismissals 
are appropriate for issues of  law on the face of  a complaint, when an affirmative 
defense is raised on a factual issue such as shareholder ramification, Tennessee courts 
have consistently ruled against granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim.
Here, the Court of  Appeals concluded that the detailed factual allegations 
presented by the Plaintiffs were sufficiently unresolved to prevent an affirmative 
defense at this stage.  Analyzing Renal Care’s Certificate of  Incorporation, 
specifically where it adopted § 102(b)(7) of  the Delaware General Corporation Law, 
which provides a shelter for corporate board members under certain conditions, the 
Court held there were significant allegations concerning the conduct of  the 
Defendants which precluded them from being protected under the statute.  The 
Court rejected the Defendants’ contention that the merger was essentially an 
extension of  their previous coverage.  Fresenius, a third-party indemnifier, was not 
bound by previous restrictions and extended liability coverage to the Defendants to 
cover breaches of  good faith.  This distinction both expanded the coverage available 
to rouge directors and erased the potential recovery actions for directors who did not 
receive the benefit of  backdated stock options.  In summation, the Court held that 
the trial court’s determination that the Plaintiffs did not “demonstrate” any 
allegations of  breach of  fiduciary duty was an “unfortunate” description, because the 
language indicated obligations on the pleader that were outside the scope of  the 
pleadings. 
In practice, corporate litigators should interpret the holding in Indiana State 
District Council of  Laborers v. Brukardt as a clear indication, given the minimal 
requirements and wide discretion afforded a plaintiff  during the pleadings, that a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is pertinent only in cases with a clear 
factual record.  Because corporate lawsuits typically involve transactional situations 
with a factual discrepancy, future successful motions to dismiss on the pleadings will 
be rare.  A more effective action by a litigator seeking an early dismissal may be to go 
ahead and move for summary judgment, which permits a court to examine the 
merits of  the case. 
CONSUMER PROTECTION
A drug manufacturer is bound not only by FDA regulations, but also by state 
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imposed duties of  care. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009). 
By Kirby Waddell 
There is a question of  whether compliance with FDA regulations means 
pharmaceutical manufacturers are protected from legal liability when injuries result 
from use of  their drug.  Where a consumer brings a state tort claim against a 
manufacturer for inadequate warning on drug labels, it invokes the manufacturer’s 
state-law duty, while the manufacturer still remains subject to the duties imposed by 
federal regulations. Courts must consider how to resolve that issue and such was the 
conflict addressed in Wyeth v. Levine.  The Court concluded that it is possible for a 
drug manufacturer to strengthen a drug label in compliance with both state and 
federal law, and that a state failure-to-warn action creates no obstacle to the 
accomplishment of  Congress’ purpose in entrusting the FDA with the responsibility 
of  regulating drugs on the market.
Drug manufacturers are required to comply with federally instituted 
regulations and receive approval from the Food and Drug Administration (the 
“FDA”) before introducing any new drug into the market.  State tort law provides 
that drug manufacturers have a duty to warn of  any risks associated with a drug.  
But, simultaneously, the FDA is in place to regulate the safety of  drugs on the 
market, including approval and regulation of  the labels that appear on each drug.  
Although the enactment of  the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) in 
the 1930s was intended to address safety concerns related to the distribution of  
drugs and other products, injuries still occur.  When they do, state tort actions are 
available to protect consumers. 
In Wyeth v. Levine, Diana Levine (“Levine”) lost her forearm due to treatment 
she received for a severe migraine headache and nausea at a local clinic.  The 
physician’s assistant addressed Levine’s ailments for a second time in one day by 
administering Phenergan – Wyeth’s brand name antihistamine used to treat nausea – 
intravenously using the IV-push method, which involves the drug being injected 
directly into a patient’s vein.  Following administration, the drug entered Levine’s 
artery, causing gangrene and resulting in the amputation of  her forearm.  When 
Levine’s injury occurred, Phenergan had an FDA approved label warning of  the 
dangers of  gangrene and amputation if  the drug were inadvertently injected into an 
artery.  The warning was there because manufacturers have been required by the 
FDA since 1962 to show that a drug is safe for use “under the conditions prescribed, 
recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling before it could distribute the 
drug.” 
Levine brought a state law failure-to-warn action against Wyeth in a Vermont 
trial court, alleging that Wyeth failed to provide adequate warning regarding the 
significant risks imposed by administering Phenergan using the IV-push method.  
Specifically, Levine argued that Phenergan’s label failed to instruct clinicians to use 
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the IV-drip, rather than IV-push, method of  intravenous administration because it 
carried less risk of  gangrene and loss of  limb.  She further alleged that the IV-push 
method was not reasonably safe considering that the foreseeable risk of  developing 
gangrene outweighed the benefits of  the drug. 
The trial court entered judgment for Levine on the jury verdict that Wyeth 
had in fact failed to provide adequate warning of  the risks associated with the IV-
push administration of  Phenergan.  The court declined to accept Wyeth’s argument 
that Levine’s failure-to-warn claim was preempted by federal law since Phenergan’s 
labeling had been approved by the FDA.  The trial court awarded Levine damages 
for pain and suffering, medical expenses, and loss of  her livelihood as a professional 
musician, and held that federal law did not preempt Levine’s claim.  Wyeth appealed, 
but the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.  The United States Supreme 
Court granted certiorari. 
Before the Supreme Court, Wyeth raised two issues involving the preemption 
of  federal law. The first was whether Levine’s state law claims were preempted due to 
impossibility for Wyeth to comply with both the state law duties to provide stronger 
warning and the federal labeling duties imposed by the FDA.  Wyeth contended it 
could not have changed the label to comply with state law duties while operating in 
accordance with the FDA regulations because the FDA requires approval of  the 
exact text of  a drug label.  The majority presented evidence, contrary to Wyeth’s 
contention, of  an FDA “Changes Being Effected” (“CBE”) regulation, which allows 
a manufacturer to make some labeling changes without receiving the FDA’s approval 
if  the change is to “add or strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution, or 
adverse reaction.”  The majority also indicated that “[t]hrough many amendments to 
the FDCA and to FDA regulations, it has remained a central premise of  federal drug 
regulation that the manufacturer bears responsibility for the content of  its label at all 
times.”  Although the FDA has the ability to reject any changes to the labeling, 
Wyeth offered no evidence that the FDA would have rejected those changes.  
Therefore, the Court held it was possible for Wyeth to strengthen Phenergan’s label 
in compliance with both state and federal law. 
Also at issue was whether Levine’s state law claims presented an obstacle to 
the accomplishment of  Congress’ purpose and objective for “entrusting an expert 
agency with drug labeling decisions.”  Supporting its contention, Wyeth presented 
the preamble to a 2006 FDA regulation which stated that “FDA approval of  labeling 
. . . preempts conflicting or contrary State law.”  The preamble continued, saying 
state law claims “threaten [the] FDA’s . . . role as the expert Federal agency 
responsible for . . . regulating drugs.”  The majority discredited Wyeth’s assertion by 
noting that Congress did not authorize the FDA to preempt state law directly.  
Therefore, the Court must determine the amount of  weight to afford the FDA’s 
opinion in its preamble. 
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Although the Court recognized that an agency has “an ability to make 
informed determinations about how state requirements may pose ‘an obstacle to the 
objectives of  Congress,’” agencies lack authority to declare preemption absent a 
delegation by Congress.  The Court emphasized that the 2006 preamble failed to 
explain its reasoning and contradicts other evidence of  Congress’ purpose.  The 
Court stipulated that “the weight we accord the agency’s explanation of  state law’s 
impact on the federal scheme depends on its thoroughness, consistency, and 
persuasiveness,” and ultimately determined that the FDA’s 2006 preamble merits no 
deference. 
Wyeth also cited the 2000 Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.6 case, where the 
Supreme Court held that state tort claims for failure to install airbags in a Honda 
conflicted with a federal Department of  Transportation regulation stipulating that 
airbags were not required for all cars.  The Court distinguished Geier from the 
present case, however, because it afforded no weight to the 2006 preamble and lacks 
further evidence that Congress regarded state tort litigation as an obstacle to 
achieving its purposes.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of  the 
Vermont Supreme Court in a split decision. 
Justice Breyer offered a separate opinion, concurring only in the judgment, in 
which he criticized the majority’s discussion of  implied preemption based on the 
interpretation of  Congress’ purposes and objectives.  He stated that “[t]he majority, 
while reaching the right conclusion in this case, demonstrates once again how 
application of  ‘purposes and objectives’ pre-emption requires inquiry into matters 
beyond the scope of  proper judicial review.”  Justice Breyer discussed the Supremacy 
Clause and noted that federal law may only preempt state law if  the statutory text of  
the federal law so stipulates.  He stated that “our federal system in general, and the 
Supremacy Clause in particular, accords pre-emptive effect to only those policies that 
are actually authorized by and effectuated through the statutory text.” 
Justice Alito, joined by two others, dissented in the opinion and proclaimed 
that state tort law is “squarely preempted” by federal law in this case.  The dissent’s 
key criticism of  the majority’s finding was that a jury should not be able to find IV-
push administration unsafe and the warning label inadequate, when the FDA had 
determined otherwise. 
As Wyeth v. Levine demonstrates, there are vastly conflicting views on the 
appropriate course of  action when state and federal law overlaps.  What both the 
majority and concurring opinions in Wyeth illustrate is that state-law duties often exist 
alongside federal regulations to ensure full consumer protection and ensure the 
constitutional balance between state and federal law.  The implications of  the 
6 529 U.S. 861 (2000). 
2009]                                                CASE COMMENTARIES                                   231
Supreme Court’s decision in both the majority opinion and the strong concurring 
opinion may reach further than the majority anticipated, making it very difficult for a 
state law claim to be preempted by federal law, and thus subjecting manufacturers to 
vast amounts of  liability for their products.  Where a manufacturer is subject to 
duties imposed by both state and federal law, a transactional attorney should advise 
his or her client not to consider obligations complete by merely following the 
standards of  federal regulations; rather, a manufacturer must frequently consider all 
risks and update labels and information given to the FDA.
CONTRACTS
A party to a contract may not avoid his or her duty to act in good faith by 
failing to provide the other party with a term essential for the completion of  
the contract. German v. Ford, No. W2007-02768-COA-R3-CV, 2009 Tenn. App. 
LEXIS 94, 2009 WL 604951 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2009).
By Justin Faith 
Although courts will not enforce an agreement that is missing an essential 
term, one party cannot terminate an agreement after hindering the other party’s 
performance by failing to provide a basic term of  that agreement.  Where two 
parties have executed a sufficiently definite document that appears to be a contract 
based on the parties’ intentions, the court favors finding a binding agreement rather 
than a preliminary negotiation, even if  the document lacks agreement on non-
essential matters.  This is especially true when the drafting party of  the agreement 
seeks to use language to avoid operation of  the agreement.  Once a contract is 
established, there is a duty of  good faith and fair dealing, which includes the implied 
condition that one party will not prevent the performance of  the other party. 
In German v. Ford, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals addressed whether an 
alleged contract involving an agreement between an investor and sub-investor that 
lacked express language requiring the investor to provide the sub-investor with the 
necessary information to perform was enforceable.  Additionally, the court addressed 
whether the investor breached the covenant of  good faith and fair dealing by failing 
to provide the sub-investor with required information necessary to perform.  The 
court held that when a sub-investor enters into an agreement to finance an investor 
through posting a letter of  credit, the investor has an implied duty to cooperate in 
the sub-investor’s performance of  its contractual obligation. 
In German, Dyer Investment Company, LLC (“Dyer”) agreed to provide the 
$12.5-million financing to meet the minimum ticket sale requirement for a prize 
fight.  Dyer would earn a profit if  ticket sales exceeded the minimum requirement, 
and it would lose money if  ticket sales were below the minimum requirement.  Dyer 
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received backup financing from sub-investors, including William Lents (“Lents”), 
whereby the sub-investors would profit if  ticket sales were above the minimum or 
pay the difference of  their proportional investment if  ticket sales were below the 
minimum.  Dyer drafted an Investment Participation Agreement (“IPA”) that 
constituted the agreement between Dyer and the sub-investors.  Lents agreed to 
guarantee $2 million in order to receive a 10-percent return of  profits on the 
assumed risk of  ticket sales.  Under the Agreement, Lents was required to post a 
letter of  credit to insure his interest in Dyer’s profits or losses. 
The IPA contained both a “time-is-of-the-essence” clause and 
representations and warranties that the agreement was legal and binding against both 
parties based on its terms.  It did not, however, contain a deadline for Lents to post 
Dyer’s letter of  credit.  To reduce Dyer’s risk of  loss, Dyer continued soliciting other 
sub-investors who signed IPAs, all while ticket sales for the fight continued to 
increase.  Although Lents appeared prepared to issue the letter of  credit while ticket 
sales were ongoing, Dyer never provided Lents with the basic information necessary 
to issue the letter of  credit.  Eventually, ticket sales reached the minimum 
requirement and Dyer, facing no risk of  loss, informed Lents that the agreement was 
terminated.  Dyer refused to pay Lents any percentage of  the profits made because 
Lents never posted a letter of  credit.  Lents then sued Dyer for his proportional 
amount invested, alleging breach of  contract and breach of  the covenant of  good 
faith and fair dealing.  Dyer argued there was no enforceable contract by the terms 
of  the IPA.  Specifically, Dyer claimed that nothing in the IPA expressly required 
Dyer to provide Lents with the letter of  credit information, and thus there was no 
legal obligation to pay any sub-investor that did not issue a letter of  credit. 
The trial court granted Dyer’s motion for summary judgment, finding there 
was no enforceable contract because Dyer retained the right to final approval of  the 
letter of  credit.  The trial court essentially found the IPA to be a preliminary 
negotiation that was unenforceable until Lents delivered the letter of  credit.  Finding 
no breach of  contract, the court also held there was no actionable claim for breach 
of  good faith and fair dealing because there was no underlying contract. 
On appeal, however, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals found that the IPA 
between Dyer and Lents was an enforceable contract and that Dyer had a duty of  
good faith and fair dealing to not hinder Lents’s performance.  The Court held that 
the IPA was more than just a preliminary agreement, as evidenced by three basic 
contract principles: (1) lack of  agreement on minor matters does not preclude the 
finding of  a contract; (2) the court presumes a document executed by both parties is 
interpreted to impose obligations on both parties; and (3) doubtful language is 
construed against the drafter of  the agreement, especially when the drafting party 
attempts to use the language to defeat the agreement.  A court will not enforce a 
contract that is too indefinite or lacks essential terms, but will consider the 
surrounding circumstances and conduct of  the parties to determine if  an agreement 
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was intended to be enforceable by the parties.  The IPA was very clear and detailed, 
stating that “[u]pon the execution of  this Agreement, [Lents] shall post an 
irrevocable standby letter of  credit” from a financial institution acceptable by Dyer.  
Thus, this language created a binding obligation on Lents to post a letter of  credit in 
the specified amount. 
Although the IPA did not include a deadline for the letter of  credit to be 
posted, the language and the express “time-is-of-the-essence” clause inferred that the 
obligation was immediate.  The IPA language and surrounding circumstances show 
that Lents had a mandatory obligation to post Dyer’s letter of  credit, guaranteeing 
financing for the specified amount soon after the parties signed the IPA.  Lents 
repeatedly requested the necessary information from Dyer, and Lents appeared 
willing to post the letter of  credit at any time.  Dyer, however, neglected to perform 
its obligations under the IPA. 
The Court held that Dyer could not assert it had no contractual obligation to 
approve or deny the letter of  credit merely because the IPA gave Dyer sole discretion 
of  approval.  Dyer was under an obligation of  good faith, in an objectively 
reasonable manner, to exercise its discretion in the approval or denial of  Lents’ 
proposed letter of  credit.  But, Dyer made no attempt to determine if  Lents’ 
proffered letter of  credit was satisfactory.  Although nothing in the IPA required 
Dyer to provide Lents with the necessary terms of  the letter of  credit by any 
particular time, the court found an implied or constructive condition in the IPA 
which required Dyer to cooperate in good faith with Lents’ performance by 
providing him with the necessary information to post the letter of  credit in a 
reasonable time. 
The Court reasoned that the facts of  the case provided an example where an 
implied condition is “necessary to meet the ends of  justice.”  First, the specific 
language and detail of  the IPA show a clear intent to have a binding contract with 
obligations on both parties.  Second, Dyer was required to cooperate, rather than 
hinder, Lents’ ability to perform posting the letter of  credit.  Here, Dyer’s obligation 
to provide Lents an interest in the agreement was based on Lents posting of  a letter 
of  credit.  The letter of  credit could not be posted without Dyer’s cooperation, 
specifically through providing Lents with the basic information needed for the letter 
of  credit.  Dyer’s failure to cooperate in providing Lents with the requisite 
information constituted a breach of  the implied duty to cooperate with Lents, which 
is a breach of  the covenant of  good faith and fair dealing.  Without the requirement 
of  cooperation, Dyer could shift all of  the risk to sub-investors while avoiding any 
payment of  potential profit.  The Court found that Dyer would be unjustly enriched 
if  it interpreted the agreement to guarantee a safety net of  sub-investors without any 
risk of  loss. 
The Court’s decision to find an enforceable contract and imply a condition 
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requiring Dyer to cooperate with Lents’ performance serves as a warning to any 
party that attempts to contract away risk through the performance of  the other party, 
but hinders that performance through the omission of  a necessary term.  First, 
Tennessee courts will imply non-express terms of  an agreement when the 
surrounding circumstances show the parties intended to have a binding contract.  
More importantly, Tennessee courts will also require parties in a contract to act in 
good faith by not hindering performance of  the other party.  In a contract where 
performance by one party is necessary to earn the compensation provided in an 
agreement and the performance cannot be completed without minimal cooperation 
by the other party, it is likely that Tennessee courts will find such cooperation to be 
an implied condition of  the agreement.  Transactional attorneys in Tennessee should 
advise clients that if  they have a pending agreement that could be interpreted as a 
contract, they then have a duty of  good faith not to hinder performance of  the 
agreement’s terms. 
A trial court’s factual findings for a promissory fraud claim that involve issues 
of  determining credibility and weighing oral testimony are accorded 
substantial deference by a reviewing court. Styles v. Blackwood, No. E2007-00416-
COA-R3-CV, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 775, 2008 WL 5396804 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 
29, 2008). 
By Robert Ingram 
Promissory fraud is a tort creating liability for a party who enters into a 
contract without the intent to perform.  It differs from fraud or misrepresentation by 
also requiring false representation of  future conduct.  To successfully plead a 
promissory fraud claim, Tennessee case law requires a plaintiff  to prove specific 
elements.  Additionally, the plaintiff  must prove these elements with clear and 
convincing evidence when seeking to rescind or reform a written instrument. 
In Styles v. Blackwood, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals addressed the amount 
of  deference to give a trial court’s finding when determining whether a defendant in 
a promissory fraud claim ever intended to perform a future obligation.  It also 
addressed how a trial court may make that determination.  The Court ultimately held 
that a trial court’s factual findings for a promissory fraud claim involving issues of  
determining credibility and weighing oral testimony should receive “substantial 
deference” from a reviewing court. 
In 1998, Nancy Styles and her mother, Alba Hughes, met Ron and Shelley 
Blackwood (the “Blackwoods”) through a mutual acquaintance.  Mr. Blackwood was 
the leader of  a singing group in Pigeon Forge called the Blackwood Quartet, and his 
wife was the sole proprietor of  Universal Management, which represented the group.  
Hughes was an elderly woman who became interested in investing her money in the 
Blackwood Quartet because she wanted her children to own a part of  Pigeon Forge.  
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The Blackwoods’ interest in the agreement stemmed from wishing to acquire a venue 
in Pigeon Forge to have regular performances.  Hughes and the Blackwoods signed a 
document memorializing an agreement, and Styles signed it as a witness.  Within the 
document, Hughes agreed to invest $75,000 in Universal Management to “obtain” 
and “secure” a theater for the Blackwood Quartet.  In exchange, Universal 
Management agreed to pay Hughes net profits from the theater venture, as well as 
interest payments on a graduated schedule. 
The Blackwoods then entered into another agreement with a theater owner 
in Pigeon Forge to perform regularly at his establishment for nine months.  The 
Blackwood Quartet performed there until the owner closed the venue three years 
later.  During this time, the Blackwoods started doing business as Blackwood 
Management, Inc., and did not distribute any profits or make any interest payments 
to Hughes.  The Blackwoods sent letters to Hughes in 1999 and 2002 reassuring her 
of  the investment, but they never paid Hughes anything that was stipulated in the 
agreement.  Hughes died in 2002, and Styles alleged that Hughes’s estate orally 
assigned the interest in the agreement to her.  Nevertheless, the Blackwoods claimed 
that none of  the original investment remained because they had spent it all on 
advertising for the performances.  This led Styles to believe that the Blackwoods had 
never intended to perform their part of  the bargain. 
In 2004, Styles brought an action against the Blackwoods and both business 
entities for fraud in inducing an agreement and promissory fraud.  Specifically, Styles 
claimed that the Blackwoods told Hughes that the investment money was for 
purchasing a theater, but they actually never intended to purchase one or pay Hughes 
a part of  the profits or interest.  During the bench trial, the Blackwoods made a 
motion to dismiss for lack of  standing and asserted that the executor of  Hughes’s 
estate never used the term “assign” and thus never transferred the interest.  But, the 
Blackwoods failed to provide any authority to support their motion.  Therefore, the 
trial court denied the motion to dismiss.  In addition, the Blackwoods objected to the 
parol evidence Styles attempted to admit during her testimony, which the court 
sustained.  The court, however, ruled in Styles’s favor by finding that the Blackwoods 
were “unbelievable,” and that they never intended to perform the future obligations 
when they made representations to Hughes. 
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals affirmed the trial court’s 
judgment by holding that Styles had standing, and held that a reviewing court must 
give “substantial deference” to a trial court’s fact finding in a promissory fraud claim 
when it involves determining credibility and weighing oral testimony.  Under 
Tennessee Rule of  Appellate Procedure 13(d), a non-jury trial receives de novo review 
on appeal, and factual findings are presumed correct unless a preponderance of  the 
evidence contradicts them.  Thus, the Court held that Styles had standing because a 
preponderance of  the evidence showed Hughes’s estate orally assigned the interest to 
her.  Since the Blackwoods did not offer any authority at trial to support their motion 
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to dismiss, the Court declined to pursue the issue on review. 
Next, the Court addressed the degree of  deference that a reviewing court 
must give a trial court’s fact finding in a promissory fraud claim when it involves oral 
testimony.  The elements of  promissory fraud in Tennessee are: “(1) a promise of  
future conduct; (2) that was material; (3) made with the intent not to perform; (4) 
that the plaintiff  reasonably relied upon (5) to plaintiff ’s injury.”  Naturally, the intent 
element is the most difficult for the fact finder.  In general, Tennessee case law grants 
considerable deference to a trial court’s credibility determinations and weighing of  
oral testimony.  Thus, the court held that a trial court’s fact finding is accorded 
“substantial deference” in a promissory fraud case when it involves both determining 
credibility and weighing oral testimony. 
The court balanced the parties’ testimony, the trial court’s observations of  
the witnesses’ demeanor, and the Blackwoods’ failure to perform any of  their 
obligations under the agreement, and determined that Styles had met her burden for 
showing promissory fraud.  Since failure to perform is insufficient alone to show 
fraudulent intent, the trial court’s observations based on the parties’ testimony were 
the significant factor for the Court.  Therefore, the Court concluded that the trial 
court did not err considering the “totality of  the circumstances.” 
The Court then addressed the question of  whether parol evidence is 
admissible in a promissory fraud action involving a written agreement.  According to 
Tennessee case law, the parol evidence rule is not applicable in cases involving fraud 
in inducement to execute a contract.  Therefore, the Court held that the fraud-in-
inducement rule applied to promissory fraud, and concluded that the trial court erred 
when it sustained the Blackwoods’ parol evidence objections to Styles’s testimony.  
The Court determined that Styles was still able to show that the Blackwoods 
misrepresented the nature of  the investment to Hughes, despite the restricted 
testimony. 
Finally, the Court rejected the Blackwoods’ argument that Mrs. Blackwood, as 
the sole proprietor of  Universal Management, was the only party liable for the 
judgment in Styles’s favor.  Because Styles’s claim sought judgment under tort 
theories, both Blackwoods and their business entities were liable for promissory 
fraud despite Mrs. Blackwood doing business as Universal Management and being 
the only party contractually obligated to perform.  The Court affirmed the trial 
court’s finding that Mr. Blackwood played a significant role in perpetrating the 
promissory fraud against Hughes.  The Court determined from the record that Mr. 
Blackwood had admitted to being involved in and responsible for the business 
operations of  both companies.  Since Mr. Blackwood participated in the 
misrepresentation and drafting of  the agreement, the Court concluded that 
“principles of  equity and fairness” supported the trial court’s decision to hold Mr. 
Blackwood and Blackwood Management, Inc. liable for promissory fraud. 
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The Tennessee Court of  Appeals’ decision to affirm the trial court’s 
judgment in Styles v. Blackwood serves as a warning for transactional attorneys who fail 
to capture the parties’ intentions in the terms of  a written agreement.  When a 
written agreement fails to elaborate these intentions and one party believes that the 
other did not intend to perform because of  their failure, the contract drafter has 
exposed the latter party to liability under a promissory fraud claim.  Furthermore, the 
case provides a tactic for plaintiffs to escape the parol evidence rule, which allows 
further post hoc interpretation of  the written terms and thus more exposure to 
liability.  In this case, defined or more specific terms would have shown that there 
was at least an attempt to perform. 
Additionally, this case shows that transactional attorneys should counsel their 
clients to make good-faith attempts to perform future obligations.  Failure even to 
attempt to perform a future obligation provides the basis for a promissory fraud 
claim that, again, allows a trial court to admit parol evidence despite the existence of  
a written document.  Finally, this case demonstrates that promissory fraud as a tort 
and the court’s loose posture towards standing creates rights, obligations, and liability 
for parties who are not signatories to a contract.  Transactional attorneys should limit 
these risks through additional terms in the written agreement. 
A party cannot avoid contractual obligations because of  a misnomer when the 
party clearly knew with whom it was conducting business. Realty Ctr. New 
Homes Div., LLC v. Dowlen Constr., LLC, No. E2008-00137-COA-R3-CV, 2008 Tenn. 
App. LEXIS 782, 2008 WL 5423997, (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2008). 
By T. Jessica Manning 
In Realty Center New Homes Division, LLC v. Dowlen Construction, LLC, the 
Tennessee Court of  Appeals addressed the use of  misnomers in contracts when the 
real identity is clearly known by the contracting parties.  The Court also looked at the 
effect of  the Tennessee Real Estate Broker License Act of  1973 on contracts where 
the name of  a party is incorrect, ultimately concluding that when one party attempts 
to avoid its obligations under a contract because the other party used the wrong 
name in the contract, the contract is valid if  there is evidence that the complaining 
party knew the identity of  the other party. 
The facts of  the case state that plaintiff  (“Realty Center”) and defendant 
(“Dowlen”) entered into a two-year contract in May 2005 allowing Realty Center to 
sell townhouses Dowlen was building in two Hamilton County subdivisions.  The 
agreement stated that the contract could be cancelled by either party at any time 
upon 90 days notice.  Realty Center signed the contract as “Realty Center/GMAC 
New Homes Division, LLC,” although it was licensed as a real estate broker under 
the name “Realty Center New Homes Division, LLC.”  The agreement was 
subsequently terminated by Dowlen, who later refused to pay commissions due to 
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Realty Center under the terms of  the contract. 
Realty Center filed a complaint seeking commissions for all sales contracts 
existing at the time of  the agreement, as well as all contracts signed after the 90-day 
notice of  termination.  Dowlen’s answer raised several defenses, including that the 
named plaintiff  was not a party to the contract.  Dowlen also filed a counterclaim 
against Realty Center, alleging that because Realty Center signed the contract in a 
name that varied from its license name, Realty Center was unlicensed, which is a 
violation of  the Tennessee Real Estate Broker License Act of  1973 ( “Act”).  Dowlen 
also asked for compensation from the harm caused to it because Realty Center used 
the trade name “GMAC” without permission. 
The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of  Realty Center, 
and held that (1) at all times under the claims Realty Center was a licensed real estate 
broker; (2) that Realty Center did not violate the Act; and (3) that Dowlen did not 
have standing to challenge the use of  “GMAC” by Realty Center.  The trial court 
also found that Realty Center had properly supported its motion for summary 
judgment by presenting evidence sufficient to shift the burden of  proof  to Dowlen 
to show that summary judgment should not be granted concerning whether Realty 
Center had the authority to use the name “GMAC.”  After a bench trial and a 
modification of  the judgment, Realty Center was awarded commissions, interest, and 
discretionary amounts. 
Dowlen filed an appeal against the trial court’s grant of  partial summary 
judgment.  It challenged the court’s dismissal of  its defenses under the Act, the 
dismissal of  its counterclaim, and the grant of  commissions to Realty Center.  
Dowlen presented four arguments on appeal, first arguing that Realty Center’s 
complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief  could be granted because the 
contracts referred to in the complaint were between Dowlen and a different entity, 
“Realty Center/GMAC New Homes Division, LLC.”  Second, Dowlen argued that 
the contracts were made and signed by “Realty Center/GMAC New Homes 
Division, LLC,” and that no such entity was licensed as a real estate broker in 
Tennessee at the time the sales occurred; thus the action was barred by Tennessee 
law.  Third, Dowlen claimed Realty Center violated Tennessee criminal law because 
the contracts were not signed by a licensed broker, meaning the contracts were 
unenforceable as a matter of  law.  Last, Dowlen sought to avoid paying commissions 
to Realty Center and attempted to recover commissions already paid because Realty 
Center was unlicensed and used the “GMAC” trade name without permission, 
resulting in damages to Dowlen. 
Dowlen’s first claim stated that Realty Center contracted with it using the 
trade name “GMAC” without authorization.  The Court of  Appeals agreed with the 
trial court, finding that it was not Dowlen’s place to bring a claim for unauthorized 
trademark usage.  Additionally, Dowlen did not offer any evidence supporting its 
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claim that it had suffered damage as a result of  Realty Center’s use of  the name 
“GMAC” in the contracts.  Therefore, Dowlen lacked the requisite standing to bring 
such a claim. 
Dowlen next argued that the trial court erred in dismissing its affirmative 
defenses and counterclaim and asserted that they should be allowed because Realty 
Center was not a licensed real estate broker.  The Court, however, relied on a 
Tennessee Supreme Court decision in finding that the misnomer itself  did not render 
the contract invalid or inoperative.  While the name on the contract between Dowlen 
and Realty Center was not identical to the name on Realty Center’s license, it was 
clear that Dowlen understood with whom it was contracting.  The Court went on to 
say that Dowlen did not rely on Realty Center’s licensure under the contract or at any 
other time.  In fact, it noted that Dowlen never expressed concern to Realty Center 
that it was a different entity than the one stated in the contract. 
The Court pointed out that the law in Tennessee regarding misnomers has 
long been established, and that Realty Center submitted enough proof  that it was the 
entity with which Dowlen had contracted.  Further, the Court found that Dowlen 
admitted Realty Center had adequately performed its duties under the contract, and 
that Realty Center did not intentionally misrepresent itself.  The Court also noted 
that Dowlen at all times was fully aware that Realty Center was a party to the 
contract.  It went on to say that Dowlen could not escape its contractual obligations 
on the premise that the party was licensed in a name slightly varied from the name 
on the contract. 
The Court further explained that business names consist of  several different 
words, making them easy to transpose or confuse.  The Court believed that Dowlen 
was trying to avoid liability by ignoring the rule that has been the law in Tennessee 
for over 100 years.  Although Dowlen argued that “Realty Center/GMAC New 
Homes Division, LLC” was an unlicensed entity, the Court stated that the entity 
existed only as a misnomer and therefore was neither licensed nor unlicensed.  It 
construed the Act to allow Realty Center to obtain real estate in that name if  it chose 
to do so, but doing so was not a requirement.  The Court also found that the Act was 
not established to require a business to be licensed in the same name under which it 
contracts. 
The Tennessee Court of  Appeals’ decision to uphold the contract between 
Realty Center and Dowlen is based on settled Tennessee law.  A party to a contract 
cannot abandon its obligations because of  a simple misnomer when it clearly knew 
who it was doing business with, nor can a party attempt to avoid contractual duties 
by construing the law to require all real estate firms to be licensed under the same 
name in which they contract.  While the law in Tennessee is not significantly changed 
by this decision, Tennessee attorneys should advise their clients to contract under 
their license name, or disclose to the other party that they are using a different name 
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to avoid the potential pitfalls of  litigation.  Attorneys should also advise their clients 
that a contracting party may use a misnomer, but that doing so will not relieve any 
obligations under the contract. 
INSURANCE
If  a life insurance policy owner defaults on his or her premium payments and 
the premiums are payable in monthly or more frequent intervals, the company 
is not required to notify the policy owner of  a lapse in his or her coverage.
Waldschmidt v. Reassure Am. Life Ins. Co., 271 S.W.3d 173 (Tenn. 2008). 
By Andrew Sumner 
The issue presented in Waldschmidt v. Reassure America Life Insurance Co. was 
whether certain exemptions apply to insurance companies when they fail to provide 
statutorily required information to the life insurance policy owner, thus allowing the 
insurer to refuse payment on the policy.  Although § 56-7-2303 of  the Tennessee 
Code provides specific guidelines for insurance companies to follow when life 
insurance policy owners fail to make premium payments, determining when and to 
what extent insurance companies should follow these guidelines and under what 
circumstances certain statutory exemptions apply can be difficult. 
These concerns are especially significant when a policy owner voluntarily 
elects to divide his or her yearly premium payments into monthly installments, 
defaults on a monthly premium payment, and dies within six months of  the default.  
Here, the Tennessee Supreme Court looked at the frequency of  the policy owner’s 
premium payments and determined that because the payments were monthly, the 
insurance company was exempted from providing notice of  default. 
In Waldschmidt, Robert H. Waldschmidt, as trustee of  Robert W. McLean’s 
bankruptcy estate, placed a hold on each of  McLean’s bank accounts.  Included in 
this hold was an account that provided monthly payments for McLean’s yearly life 
insurance premium.  As a result, McLean’s life insurance company – Reassure 
America Life Insurance Company (“Reassure”) – was unable to withdraw the 
premium payment that was due on August 5, 2007 from McLean’s bank account.  
On August 10, 2007, Reassure sent a letter to McLean informing him of  its inability 
to withdraw funds from the bank account and warned him that failure to pay the 
premium would result in a lapse in coverage.  McLean informed Waldschmidt of  the 
notification and Waldschmidt promptly changed the mailing address associated with 
the insurance policy from McLean’s address to his own.  On September 5, 2007, 
Reassure sent an additional notification informing Waldschmidt that, because 
Reassure had not received McLean’s August premium payment, McLean’s life 
insurance policy had “lapsed without value.”  McLean died 20 days later on 
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September 25, 2007, and Reassure refused to disburse the $1,000,000 due under 
McLean’s life insurance policy. 
Waldschmidt subsequently filed an adversary complaint in bankruptcy court 
against Reassure, contending that McLean’s life insurance coverage had not lapsed 
before McLean’s death.  Waldschmidt asserted that Reassure violated § 56-7-2303(a) 
of  the Tennessee Code because Reassure failed to provide sufficient notice of  
McLean’s default in payment before Reassure declared McLean’s coverage lapsed.  
Conversely, Reassure maintained that because McLean had chosen to make monthly 
payments on his yearly life insurance premiums, § 56-7-2303(d) did not require 
Reassure to provide the notice necessitated by § 56-7-2303(a). 
Because the Tennessee Supreme Court had never interpreted § 56-7-2303, 
the bankruptcy court entered an order on May 22, 2008 deferring two certified 
questions of  law for the Supreme Court.  The first issue concerned whether § 56-7-
2303(d) excluded Reassure from the statutory notice requirement listed under § 56-7-
2303(a) because McLean elected to pay his yearly insurance premiums in monthly 
installments, or whether § 56-7-2303(a) required Reassure to provide McLean with 
sufficient notice of  McLean’s default in payment and lapse in coverage. 
Under § 56-7-2303(a), insurance companies are required to provide 
defaulting policy owners with specific information within six months of  a default in 
payment before declaring the policy owner’s life insurance coverage lapsed.  This 
required information includes the amount of  the policy owner’s premium, the 
amount due on the policy, and the contact information of  the person or company to 
which the amount is payable.  The notice must also indicate that a failure to pay the 
premium will result in a lapse in coverage of  the policy.  On the other hand, § 56-7-
2303(d) is treated as an exemption, and provides that insurance companies are not 
required to satisfy the notice requirement when the policy owner’s premiums are 
payable on “monthly or at more frequent intervals.”  A life insurance premium is 
payable monthly “if  it must or may be paid on a monthly basis.” 
The plain meaning of  these statutes infers that the type of  life insurance 
premium (yearly or monthly) is inconsequential; instead, the applicability of  the § 56-
7-2303(d) exemption depends on the frequency of  each premium payment.  “[I]f  [the 
premium payment] must or may be paid on a monthly basis,” § 56-7-2303(d) controls 
and the notice requirement listed under § 56-7-2303(a) is waived.  While many life 
insurance policies (including McLean’s) provide policy owners with yearly premiums, 
the fact that a policy owner willfully elects to make monthly payments on an annual 
premium does not defeat the § 56-7-2303(d) exemption. 
Consequently, the court held that although a defaulting policy owner may 
choose to voluntarily pay monthly installments on his or her annual life insurance 
premiums, when such a situation arises, the premium payments remain payable on 
“monthly or at more frequent intervals.”  As a result, the court held that § 56-7-
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2303(d) exempts the insurance company from having to provide proper notice of  
the policy owner’s default in payment and lapse in coverage. 
The second issue certified for the court was conditioned on the court’s 
adjudication of  the first certified question.  The second issue concerned the 
sufficiency of  the “default in payment” notice that Reassure provided McLean and 
Waldschmidt.  If  the court had found that § 56-7-2303(a) required Reassure to 
provide McLean with notice of  forfeiture, the court would have been forced to 
determine whether Reassure satisfied each element of  the notice requirement, as 
specified by § 56-7-2303(a).  The court would have also had to establish whether 
McLean’s life insurance policy lapsed before his death.  However, because the court 
found that § 56-7-2303(d) exempted Reassure from providing McLean with the 
“default in payment” notification, the court held that it was unnecessary to make a 
determination on this second certified question. 
As Waldschmidt v. Reassure America Life Insurance Co. demonstrates, something 
as seemingly insignificant as the frequency of  premium payments can have a 
profound impact on the capacity of  life insurance policy beneficiaries to recover 
proceeds after a default in payment occurs.  Likewise, the frequency of  such 
payments also influences the specific procedures that life insurance companies must 
follow when a policy owner fails to provide payment on his or her premium.  When 
such a situation arises, attorneys that represent insurance companies and potential 
life insurance policy owners should be aware of  the distinct requirements and 
exemptions under § 56-7-2303 and take appropriate steps to protect the interests of  
their respective clients.  By failing to take these measures, a policy owner’s life 
insurance coverage could unexpectedly lapse, causing the beneficiary to fail to receive 
the potentially sizeable payouts that he or she may have anticipated. 
LABOR & EMPLOYMENT
Collective bargaining agreements that require union members to arbitrate 
specific statutory claims are enforceable. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 
1456 (2009). 
By Byron Pugh 
Employers and labor unions can negotiate a collective bargaining agreement 
(“CBA”) that requires union members to submit their grievances into an arbitration 
process.  The United States Supreme Court established boundaries and created 
protections in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), and Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), that seek to prevent employees from 
losing their right to bring discrimination and other statutory claims before a court of  
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law.  Nevertheless, confusion remained as to whether a CBA can waive an individual 
employee’s right to judicial redress.  In 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, the United States 
Supreme Court held that when a CBA “clearly and unmistakably” mandates 
arbitration of  specific statutory claims, it is “enforceable as a matter of  federal law.” 
Steve Pyett (“Pyett”) and his co-workers worked in the building-services 
industry and were members of  the Service Employees International Union 
(“SEIU”).  According to the National Labor Relations Act of  1935 (“NLRA”), the 
SEIU is the “exclusive bargaining representative” of  the building-services employees 
in New York City.  For over 70 years, the SEIU and the Realty Advisory Board of  
Labor Relations, Inc. (“RABLR”) have engaged in industry-wide collective 
bargaining.  The CBA between the two entities required union employees to file “all 
claims of  employment discrimination to binding arbitration.”  The CBA states: 
§ 30 NO DISCRIMINATION.  There shall be no discrimination 
against any present or future employee by reason of  race, creed, 
color, age, disability, national origin, sex, union membership, or any 
other characteristic protected by law, including, but not limited to, 
claims made pursuant to Title VII of  the Civil Rights Act, the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, . . . .  All such claims shall be subject to the grievance and 
arbitration procedures . . . as the sole and exclusive remedy for violations . . . .”7
As a member of  RABLR, 14 Penn Plaza LLC (“Penn”) owns and operates 
an office building in New York City where Pyett worked.  Pyett was directly 
employed as a night lobby watchman by co-petitioner Temco Service Industries, Inc.  
With the approval of  the SEIU, Penn hired a union friendly security contractor – 
Spartan Security – to staff  the lobby and entrances of  its building with licensed 
security guards.  With licensed security guards, Penn no longer needed Pyett in his 
capacity. Pyett was thus reassigned to other jobs, which he claimed caused financial 
and emotional harm. 
The SEIU filed grievances on behalf  of  Pyett, alleging that the reassignment 
violated the CBA provision against age discrimination.  None of  the claims were 
successful, so the SEIU requested arbitration under the CBA.  Following the first 
hearing, the SEIU withdrew the age discrimination claims. In May 2004, during the 
arbitration period, Pyett filed a complaint pursuant to the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of  1967 (“ADEA”) with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”).  Based on the evidence, the EEOC determined that a 
violation did not occur, but informed Pyett of  his right to sue. 
Pyett filed suit against Penn in the United States District Court for the 
7 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1460 (2009) (emphasis added).
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Southern District of  New York, claiming that the reassignments violated the ADEA, 
as well as state and local anti-age discrimination laws. Penn responded by filing a 
motion to compel arbitration of  Pyett’s claims.  The district court denied the motion, 
holding that “even a clear and unmistakable union-negotiated waiver of  a right to 
litigate certain federal and state statutory claims in a judicial forum is 
unenforceable.”8
Upon review, the Second Circuit Court of  Appeals affirmed the district 
court’s opinion in an effort to clarify the Gardner-Denver and Gilmer decisions.  The 
Court in Gardner-Denver held that a CBA cannot waive a worker’s right to a judicial 
remedy against an employer who violates statutory protections.  Twenty years later, 
the Court in Gilmer ruled that an individual employee who waives his or her right to 
the federal courts in exchange for arbitration must arbitrate.  The Second Circuit 
held that a CBA containing a statutory arbitration provision that attempts to waive 
an employee’s access to a federal forum is unenforceable. 
The Supreme Court granted Penn’s writ of  certiorari in order to resolve the 
circuit split.  Pyett argued that the arbitration provision was unenforceable for three 
reasons: (1) the arbitration provision regulates an individual’s “statutory right” 
guaranteed by the ADEA, not the contractual economic benefits of  the CBA; (2) the 
decision in Gilmer precludes the waiver of  an individual’s “substantial right;” and (3) 
the Gardner-Denver decision places an employee’s statutory antidiscrimination rights 
above the labor union’s interests.  The Court rejected each argument and turned a 
critical eye to the dicta regarding arbitration in Gardner-Denver.
The Court reversed the appellate decision, holding that a CBA which “clearly 
and unmistakably” requires arbitration of  ADEA claims is enforceable.  First, the 
Court reasoned that arbitration procedures and collective bargaining arrangements 
are favored because they involve economic tradeoffs.  Similar to contract 
negotiations, a labor union may agree to an arbitration provision in exchange for 
additional concessions from the employer. 
Second, the decision in Gilmer precludes arbitration if  it was the intention of  
Congress to prevent a waiver of  a judicial solution for the statutory claims at issue.  
This intent would be shown in the language of  the statute or the legislative history.  
Nothing in the ADEA or its legislative history, however, suggests intent to preclude 
arbitration.  Furthermore, the Gilmer decision did not draw a distinction between 
arbitration provisions approved by individual employees and those negotiated by 
labor unions.  Without such a distinction, the Gilmer rule is applicable in individual 
agreements as well as CBAs.  The Court spoke definitively on at least one 
requirement: arbitration provisions must be “explicitly stated” in the CBA.  Finally, 
8 Id. at 1462-63 (citation omitted). 
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the holding in Gardner-Denver is not applicable because the decision is based on a 
CBA arbitration provision concerning contractual claims, rather than statutory 
claims. 
Without relying on Gardner-Denver, the Court based its holding on the 
statutory language of  the NLRA, the ADEA, and the holding in Gilmer.  The NLRA 
gave the SEIU and the RABLR the exclusive power to collectively bargain regarding 
“conditions of  employment.”  The Court in past decisions considers an arbitration 
provision in a CBA to be a condition of  employment.  The final CBA in 14 Penn 
Plaza LLC clearly and unmistakably precluded employees from filing discrimination 
claims, specifically claims brought under the ADEA, in a judicial forum.  Moreover, 
Congress did not in any way include language in the statute that would forbid 
arbitration.  Therefore, the arbitration provision in the CBA was enforceable. 
Finally, the Court sought to remove some “skepticism” about arbitration 
proceedings embodied in the Gardner-Denver holding.  The Court criticized the 
decision for confusing arbitration of  discrimination claims with a prospective waiver 
of  the substantial right.  Arbitrating an ADEA claim does not waive an employee’s 
right to file a claim; rather, it limits where it can be filed.  Furthermore, the Court 
rejected the notion that arbitration tribunals are somehow incapable of  rendering a 
sound legal decision and cautioned courts not to mistake an arbitrator’s efficiency for 
incompetency. 
Although the dissenting opinion accuses the majority of  taking a cursory 
look at Gardner-Denver and ignoring stare decisis, the holding in 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. 
Pyett provides clear guidelines for employers, labor unions, and employees.  
Employers and labor unions that choose to employ a statutory arbitration provision 
should no longer fear reprisal from the judiciary.  As the Court notes, arbitration 
provisions provide considerable economic benefits to employers, especially in high-
cost, employment discrimination litigation.  The employee whose union is their 
exclusive collective bargaining representative, however, should proceed with caution.  
In light of  this ruling, a transactional lawyer is strongly advised to encourage 
corporate clients to insist on a “clear and unmistakable” arbitration provision for 
statutory discrimination claims when negotiating a CBA.
An employer cannot penalize an employee who brings forth an allegation of  
sexual harassment in response to questions presented during an employer’s 
internal investigation of  sexual harassment. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of  Nashville 
& Davidson County, 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009).
By Will Woods 
Title VII of  the Civil Rights Act of  1964 contains an anti-retaliation 
provision that prohibits employers from penalizing employees who report 
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discrimination in the workplace known as the “opposition clause.”  The statute also 
contains a provision known as the “participation clause,” which prohibits 
discrimination against employees who have participated in any way in an 
investigation undertaken by their employer.  The ostensible rationale behind this 
policy is that employees should not be deterred from bringing legitimate causes of  
action against their employers due to fear of  losing their jobs. 
The issue addressed by the Supreme Court in Crawford v. Metropolitan 
Government of  Nashville & Davidson County was whether Title VII protects an 
employee who does not voluntarily file a sexual harassment claim, but instead 
discloses such discrimination in response to questioning from an employer during an 
internal investigation of  sexual harassment.  The Court held that the protection 
afforded by the opposition clause under Title VII extends to an employee who 
brings forth an allegation of  sexual harassment when answering questions during an 
employer’s investigation of  sexual harassment complaints. 
In Crawford, the metropolitan government of  Nashville (“Metro”) conducted 
an internal investigation after learning of  alleged instances of  sexual harassment by 
Gene Hughes, the employee relations director of  the Metro School District.  
Veronica Frazier, a Metro human resources officer, interviewed multiple Metro 
employees, including Vicky Crawford, regarding Hughes’s alleged misconduct.  
When asked whether she had observed Hughes engage in “inappropriate behavior,” 
Crawford described several incidents involving lewd gestures made by Hughes.  She 
revealed that Hughes had pressed his crotch up against her office window on 
multiple occasions, and during one incident had grabbed Crawford’s head and pulled 
it toward his crotch. 
Metro terminated Crawford’s employment soon after the investigation was 
concluded, citing embezzlement as the reason for her dismissal.  In response, 
Crawford filed a charge of  discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”) for violation of  Title VII, alleging that Metro’s actions 
constituted retaliation, and thus violated both the opposition and participation 
clauses. 
The United States District Court for the Middle District of  Tennessee, 
however, granted summary judgment in favor of  Metro, holding that Crawford’s 
allegations did not satisfy either the opposition or the participation clause.  With 
regard to the opposition clause, the court held that Crawford’s responses to 
questions concerning Hughes’s misconduct did not constitute opposition because 
she had not formally filed a complaint against her employer.  In addition, the court 
found that her claim failed under the participation clause because, pursuant to Sixth 
Circuit precedent, Title VII protection extended only to employees who were 
participating in an internal investigation that was undertaken as a result of  a pending 
charge filed with the EEOC.  Since Metro’s internal investigation was not initiated in 
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response to an EEOC charge, Crawford was not afforded such protection. 
On appeal, the district court’s ruling was affirmed based on analogous 
reasoning.  The Court of  Appeals for the Sixth Circuit maintained that because 
Crawford had failed to actively pursue a claim against Metro prior to her termination, 
she had not sufficiently opposed the sexual harassment in order to trigger protection 
under the opposition clause.  The court also held that Crawford failed to establish 
any violation of  the participation clause, reiterating the district court’s finding that 
Metro’s internal investigation had not stemmed from an employee complaint filed 
with the EEOC. 
After granting Crawford’s petition for certiorari, however, the Supreme Court 
held that Crawford’s actions during the investigation were sufficient under the 
opposition clause to trigger Title VII protection.  In an opinion written by Justice 
Souter, the Court concluded that Crawford’s responses to the questions presented 
during the investigation conveyed her clear opposition to Hughes’s behavior, 
regardless of  whether she had initiated a formal complaint.  The Court first noted 
that the specific language of  the opposition clause prohibits an employer from 
discriminating against an employee who has “opposed any practice made an unlawful 
employment practice” by the statute.  The Court then noted that Webster’s New 
International Dictionary identifies the word “oppose” as denoting the phrase “to 
resist.”  It could thus reasonably be assumed that because Hughes’s actions were 
highly inappropriate, Crawford naturally disapproved of  such behavior, and therefore 
adequately “resisted” it.  The Court further noted that according to the guidelines set 
forth by the EEOC, whenever an employee informs an employer that that employer 
has engaged in discriminatory conduct, such communication “virtually always” 
constitutes opposition to such activity. 
Metro, in turn, attempted to convince the Court that requiring an employee 
to initiate a formal complaint was necessary on public policy grounds.  Metro argued 
that if  the standard for proving retaliation by an employer was lowered, employers 
would have less incentive to investigate discrimination in the workplace.  The Court 
rejected this argument because it ignored the doctrine of  vicarious liability.  Citing 
previous Supreme Court decisions, the Court claimed that employers would still have 
a significant incentive to avoid workplace discrimination because they could still be 
held liable for cultivating an “actionable hostile environment.”  Additionally, in the 
event that an employee failed to formally take action against an employer, the 
employer would then have a viable defense to a Title VII claim as long as the 
employer took reasonable steps to prevent or remedy any discriminatory conduct, 
such as initiating an internal investigation.
Finally, the Court held that Metro’s argument would promote unsound policy 
because it would make employees less likely to come forward with legitimate claims 
of  discrimination.  If  employees could be reprimanded simply for responding to 
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questions from an employer, employees like Crawford would have no incentive to 
report discriminatory conduct.  Not only would an employer be allowed to penalize 
employees for revealing discriminatory behavior during an internal investigation, but 
the employer would also likely be able to escape liability if  the employee filed a Title 
VII suit after the investigation.  In such a scenario, the employer would be able to 
argue that reasonable steps had been taken (i.e. the investigation) to remedy the 
alleged discrimination.  The Court held that this placed the employee in an 
unreasonable position and undermined the very purpose of  Title VII. 
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Crawford represents an expansion of  the 
protection afforded to employees under Title VII.  An employee who presents 
allegations of  discrimination to an employer as part of  an internal investigation is 
shielded from reprimand for taking such action.  Crawford does not, however, clearly 
delineate the extent of  such protection.  For one, the Court did not address whether 
Metro’s actions were also in violation of  the participation clause.  In addition, the 
Court remanded the case without ruling on the defenses raised by Metro apart from 
the limits of  the opposition and participation clauses.  Finally, as noted by Justice 
Alito in his concurring opinion, the Court did not provide a clear definition of  the 
term “oppose” for purposes of  enforcing the opposition clause.  For instance, it is 
unclear whether conduct such as silent opposition would be given Title VII 
protection, since it could be argued that silent disapproval of  discrimination also 
constitutes “resistance.” 
The Court in Crawford clearly indicates that voicing allegations of  
employment discrimination during an internal investigation is sufficient to trigger 
Title VII protection, thus enhancing an employee’s incentive to report discriminatory 
conduct.  The Court’s ruling does not, however, clearly establish the scope of  the 
protection available under the opposition clause.  Specifically, the Court’s decision 
fails to adequately define the term “oppose” under the statute.  Therefore, 
transactional attorneys should caution their clients to refrain from reprimanding 
employees who disclose to the employer any instance of  employment discrimination, 
because such communication may constitute sufficient opposition, thus triggering 
Title VII protection.
REAL ESTATE
Lienors that provide materials for projects involving multiple building units 
must apportion liens between each individual unit in order to have priority 
against subsequent purchasers and encumbrances. Williamson County Ready Mix, 
Inc. v. Pulte Homes Tenn. Ltd. P’ship, No. M2007-01710-COA-R3-CV, 2008 Tenn. App. 
LEXIS 800, 2008 WL 5234730 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2008). 
By Brittany Brent
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In Williamson County Ready Mix, Inc. v. Pulte Homes Tennessee Limited Partnership,
the Tennessee Court of  Appeals analyzed Tennessee’s materialman’s lien statutes 
with respect to materials provided for the construction of  a townhome development.  
The Court held that a lienholder that provides materials for the construction of  
multiple buildings – each containing multiple townhome units – is required to 
apportion the amount of  its liens between each townhome in order for the liens to 
have priority against subsequent purchasers and encumbrances.  An unapportioned 
lien, however, is still sufficient to perfect a lien against the original owner of  the 
property. 
Williamson County Ready Mix, Inc. (“Ready Mix”) entered into a contract 
with Excalibur Construction (“Excalibur”) for Ready Mix to provide Excalibur with 
concrete and other materials for the construction of  the townhome development 
Creekside of  Brentwood (“Creekside”).  Ready Mix provided the materials on a 
building-by-building basis.  Excalibur contracted with Pulte Homes Tennessee 
Limited Partnership (“Pulte”) – the owner and general contractor of  Creekside – to 
provide concrete foundations, driveways, walkways, patios, and HVAC pads for the 
development.  Pulte paid Excalibur according to the parties’ contract, but Excalibur 
failed to pay Ready Mix and subsequently declared Chapter 7 bankruptcy. 
In September 2006, Ready Mix served five notices of  non-payment – one for 
each building in Creekside – on Pulte, the townhome owners, and the mortgage 
holders (collectively “the defendants”).  At the same time, Ready Mix served five 
sworn notices of  lien on the defendants.  In December 2006, Ready Mix filed a 
sworn complaint against the defendants alleging claims under both the mechanic’s 
and materialman’s lien statutes, as well as a claim for unjust enrichment.  Ready Mix 
requested an attachment against the defendants’ real property, referencing the sworn 
complaint and claiming a debt of  $40,752.54.  Ready Mix’s sworn complaint 
originally did not include a dollar amount, and it only identified the numbers of  the 
recorded notices of  lien, but was later amended to include the amount associated 
with each of  the five liens. 
After the trial court denied the defendants’ motion for partial dismissal or, in 
the alternative, to quash the writ of  attachment, the defendants answered the 
complaint and moved for summary judgment.  The defendants argued five grounds 
for dismissal of  Ready Mix’s materialman’s lien claims, in addition to arguing that 
Ready Mix’s unjust enrichment claim should be dismissed because Pulte made full 
payment to Excalibur, the entity with which it contracted.  Ready Mix also moved for 
summary judgment.  The trial court granted the defendants’ summary judgment 
motion as to the unjust enrichment claim, but granted Ready Mix’s motion for 
summary judgment as to the liens, concluding that Ready Mix was entitled to enforce 
the liens by sale of  the property or Pulte’s interest to compensate Ready Mix under 
its contract. 
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On appeal, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals modified in part and affirmed in 
part, ultimately holding that a lienor who provided materials for multiple townhome 
units was statutorily required to apportion the amount of  its liens between each 
townhome in order for the liens to have priority against subsequent purchasers and 
encumbrances. 
The first issue the court considered was whether Ready Mix was required to 
serve the notices of  non-payment on Excalibur rather than on Pulte, since Excalibur 
was the company with which Ready Mix contracted.  The court concluded that under 
§ 66-11-145(a) of  the Tennessee Code, Ready Mix properly served the notices on 
Pulte, as the owner and general contractor of  Creekside, rather than on Excalibur, a 
subcontractor.9
Secondly, the court considered the central issue of  the case: whether § 66-11-
118(b)(1) required Ready Mix to apportion its claims and file a separate lien on each 
defendant’s townhome, rather than file a blanket lien that encompassed each 
building.  Section 66-11-115(b) requires a materialman, within 90 days of  expiration 
of  the materialman’s contract or completion of  the building or improvement, to 
notify the owner of  the property that a lien is being claimed.  Additionally, § 66-11-
112(a) states that in order to perfect a lien against subsequent purchasers or 
encumbrances without notice, the lienor must record the lien in the register of  deeds 
office in the county in which the property is located.  The statute does not, however, 
require the same recordation in order to perfect a lien against the owner of  the 
property, as written notice is sufficient. 
Finally, § 66-11-118(b)(1) governs the procedure for liens involving multiple 
lots or improvements.  The statute provides that a lienor that furnishes materials for 
more than one building, condominium unit, or other improvements shall apportion 
its contract price between the separate buildings, units, or improvements and file a 
separate claim of  lien for the amount demanded against each. 
In analyzing the application of  these statutes, the court determined that 
because Ready Mix provided materials for the construction of  separate townhome 
units, § 66-11-118(b)(1) required Ready Mix to apportion its liens between each 
townhome unit.  In doing so, the court rejected Ready Mix’s argument that since it 
provided materials on a building-by-building basis, it could apportion its liens in the 
same manner.  The Court accordingly held that since Ready Mix failed to apportion 
its liens among each townhome unit, its recordation of  the unapportioned lien 
notices was not sufficient to provide notice to subsequent purchasers or 
encumbrancers, as required by § 66-11-115.  Since written notice is all that is 
9
 The mechanics’ and materialman’s lien statutes cited (Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-11-101, et seq.), 
were substantially amended by 2007 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 189. 
2009]                                                CASE COMMENTARIES                                   251
statutorily required to perfect a lien against the original owner of  property, however, 
the notice of  lien served on Pulte was sufficient without apportioned recordation. 
Next, the court considered whether Ready Mix’s lien claims should fail 
because it did not obtain a separate writ of  attachment for each townhome.  Pulte 
argued that the single writ issued was overly broad, and that it should have been 
issued only against Pulte’s remaining ownership interest in the property.  Noting that 
the problem was one of  form and not of  substance, however, the court concluded 
that Ready Mix should be permitted to amend the writ to more accurately describe 
the property attached. 
Finally, the court considered whether Ready Mix’s failure to include in its 
complaint a statement of  the amount of  debt or demand was fatal to its claims, 
rendering the liens improperly enforced under § 66-11-115(c).  Section 66-11-126 of  
the Tennessee Code requires that when a lienor had not contracted with the owner, 
its writ of  attachment must be accompanied by (1) an affidavit setting forth the facts, 
describing the attached property, and making the necessary parties defendants; and 
(2) a warrant for the sum claimed.  The court, however, determined that the 
complaint accompanying the writ, containing a verification signed by Ready Mix’s 
executive vice-president and secretary making the necessary oath, was sufficient to 
satisfy the requirement. 
Moreover, § 29-6-113 governs the proper issuance of  an attachment and 
statutorily required Ready Mix or its agent or attorney to make an oath in writing, 
stating (1) the nature and amount of  debt or demand; and (2) that the claim is just.  
The complaint accompanying Ready Mix’s writ did not include the amounts claimed, 
and thus there was no sworn statement as to the amount of  the liens.  Again noting 
that the problem was one of  form and not of  substance, the court concluded that 
Ready Mix’s amended complaint corrected the defect because it included the dollar 
amounts associated with each lien. 
The decision in Williamson County Ready Mix, Inc. v. Pulte Homes Tennessee 
Limited Partnership clarifies that lienors who provide materials for projects involving 
multiple building units must apportion liens between each individual unit in order to 
have priority against subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers.  In practice, 
transactional attorneys representing companies that provide materials to 
developments involving multiple building units should advise their clients that careful 
adherence to the materialman’s lien statutes is imperative.  Failing to properly 
apportion, record, or notice liens can be fatal to successfully perfecting a lien, thus 
preventing lien holders from recovering funds to which they are entitled by contract. 
TAX
An agreement that does not allow a lender to require return of  securities at 
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any time upon short notice reduces the lender’s opportunity for gain under 
IRC § 1058(b)(3) and is not considered a securities lending agreement. Samueli 
v. Comm’r, 132 T.C. 4 (2009). 
By Lindy Degnan Harris 
A securities lending agreement involves the transfer of  securities from a 
lender to a borrower in exchange for collateral as security for the borrower’s 
obligation to return the securities upon termination of  the lending agreement.  
Neither the original transfer of  securities to the borrower nor the subsequent 
transfer of  securities back to the lender is a taxable event, so long as the agreement is 
properly structured under the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”).  The arrangement 
must not alter the lender’s economic position, and it must not reduce the lender’s risk 
of  loss or opportunity for gain in the securities loaned. 
In Samueli v. Commissioner, the Tax Court considered whether an agreement, 
which was documented as a securities loan but did not enable the lender to require 
the borrower to return the securities at any time upon short notice, reduced the 
lender’s opportunity for gain under IRC § 1058(b)(3).  The Court held that the 
agreement was not a securities lending agreement under the IRC, because the 
inability of  the taxpayer to require the return of  the securities on all but three days 
of  the 450-day term reduced the taxpayer’s opportunity for gain on the securities.  
Thus, the taxpayers were not entitled to the claimed interest deductions on the 
agreement because it did not exist. 
In October 2001, the Samuelis purchased $1.64 billion of  agency STRIPS 
(the “Securities”) on margin from their broker, Refco Securities, Inc.  The Samuelis 
immediately loaned the Securities back to Refco under a fixed-term securities loan.  
Refco posted $1.64 billion in cash collateral with the Samuelis, who then used the 
cash collateral to repay the margin loan.  The Samuelis were required to pay a 
variable rate interest fee on the collateral in the form of  a “borrow fee.”  They made 
a $7.8-million interest payment in December 2001 and received that amount back 
from Refco two weeks later.  Refco recorded the transaction as additional cash 
collateral, allowing the Samuelis to borrow an additional $7.8 million because the 
Securities had increased in value. 
Under the agreement, the lending arrangement would terminate on January 
15, 2003.  Rather than return the Securities, Refco was required to purchase the 
Securities on the termination date.  The Samuelis also had the right to early 
termination of  the agreement on July 1 or December 2, 2002, but did not exercise 
that right.  On January 15, 2003, Refco purchased the securities for $1.69 billion, the 
amount at which the Securities were trading at that time.  The Samuelis then paid 
Refco $1.68 billion, which included repayment of  the $1.64 billion cash collateral 
plus unpaid variable rate fees that had accrued during the term of  the agreement.  
The Samuelis made a profit of  approximately $13 million on the transaction. 
2009]                                                CASE COMMENTARIES                                   253
On their 2001 tax return, the Samuelis claimed an interest deduction for their 
portion of  the $7.8 million wired to Refco as an accrued interest payment on 
December 28, 2001.  On their return for 2003, the Samuelis reported that they 
realized a $50,661,926 gain from the transaction, which they classified as a long-term 
capital gain because they held the securities for longer than one year.  The Samuelis 
also classified the $1.68 billion that they paid as accrued cash collateral fees and 
deducted $32,792,720 as interest for 2003. 
The Commissioner determined that the transaction did not qualify as a 
securities lending arrangement under § 1058 of  the IRC.  Rather, the Commissioner 
determined that the Samuelis purchased the Securities from Refco in October 2001 
and then immediately sold the Securities back.  Then, pursuant to a forward contract 
obligation, the Samuelis repurchased the Securities and immediately resold them to 
Refco in January 2003 as part of  a separate transaction under the same agreement. 
The Commissioner therefore determined that the Samuelis realized no gain 
or loss on the sale in 2001 and realized a short-term capital gain of  approximately 
$13 million on the sale in 2003.  As a result, the Samuelis could not deduct the cash 
collateral interest fees claimed, because no debt existed.  The Commissioner thus 
found that the Samuelis had federal income tax deficiencies of  $2,177,532 in 2001 
and $171,026 in 2003. 
The Samuelis petitioned the Tax Court, and both parties moved for summary 
judgment.  The court ruled in favor of  the Commissioner, holding that the 
transaction did not qualify as a securities lending arrangement under § 1058(b)(3), 
and that the Samuelis could not deduct interest claimed paid because the debt 
claimed was related to a transaction that did not exist. 
Section 1058 of  the IRC, which governs securities lending arrangements, 
generally provides that the delivery of  securities to the borrower at the outset of  the 
transaction and receipt of  the securities by the lender upon termination of  the 
transaction are not taxable events, as long as all of  the requirements of  that section 
are satisfied.  The Court specifically considered § 1058(b)(3), which requires that a 
securities loan agreement must not reduce the lender’s risk of  loss or opportunity for 
gain in the securities loaned.  Because the agreement prevented the Samuelis from 
causing Refco to transfer the Securities back to the Samuelis on all but three days of  
the 450-day transaction period, the Court found that the agreement did in fact 
reduce the Samuelis’ opportunity for gain within the meaning of  § 1058(b)(3).  The 
Samuelis’ opportunity for gain was reduced because the agreement limited their 
ability to sell the Securities any time the possibility of  a profitable sale arose.  
Therefore, during the term period, their opportunity for gain as to the Securities was 
reduced because their ability to realize a gain on the Securities was less with the 
agreement than it would have been without the agreement. 
The Court also concluded that the legislative history of  § 1058 supported the 
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holding, because it was enacted to codify firmly established law requiring that a 
securities loan agreement should not alter the economic position of  the lender.  
Further, the lender must be able to terminate the loan agreement upon demand.  The 
court also stressed the economic reality of  a transaction as the basis for 
characterization, rather than the stated classification of  the parties involved.  Here, 
the Court held that the economic reality established the transaction not as a securities 
lending arrangement, but as two separate sales of  the Securities without any resulting 
debt obligation throughout the term of  the agreement. 
The decision in Samueli v. Commissioner implies that in order to qualify for 
favorable tax treatment under § 1058, securities loan agreements should be 
structured to give the lender the right to require, on short notice, the return of  
loaned securities or other identical securities at any time throughout the term of  the 
loan.  The required notice should likely not be more than three days, because the 
regular-way stock settlement for corporate securities is usually three days.  Although 
the Court did not base its decision on the Samuelis’ motives underlying the 
transaction, it seems apparent that the agreement was designed to provide them with 
tax benefits.  It is unclear, however, just how extensively the specific circumstances 
of  this case affected the Court’s decision.  To be safe, attorneys should closely 
examine the economic reality of  the proposed transaction, and should include a 
provision allowing the lender to terminate the agreement and require the borrower 
to return the stocks at any time upon short notice.  Thus, the substance of  the 
agreement will be in harmony with the form, and courts will be more likely to 
enforce the agreement as intended by the parties. 
Withholding of  deferred payments due to ongoing litigation does not qualify 
for the common law claim of  offset, thus the revenue must still be recognized 
under Treasury Regulation section 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii)(A) (2006). Trinity Indus., Inc. 
v. Comm’r, No. 12395-06, 2009 T.C. LEXIS 2, 2009 WL 195934 (T.C. Jan. 28, 2009).
By Jimmy Mitchell 
For most companies, the accrual basis method of  accounting is required in 
the recording and analyzing of  income generated from daily operations.  Under this 
method, income is generally recognized upon the culmination of  a series of  events 
that fixes a company’s right to receive payment.  Thus, in the year when the last event 
occurs that unconditionally fixes the right to receive income, the accrual basis 
taxpayer has an obligation to report the income.  In Trinity Industries, Inc. v. 
Commissioner of  Internal Revenue, the United States Tax Court addressed the issue of  
whether Trinity, as an accrual basis taxpayer, was required to accrue deferred 
payments that its customer had claimed rights of  offset to from damages arising 
under a previous contract.  The Court ultimately held that the deferred payments 
must be accrued. 
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In Trinity Industries, Trinity Marine, a subsidiary of  Trinity Inc., entered into a 
contract to build barges for J. Russell Flowers, Inc. (“Flowers”) and Florida Marine 
Transporters, Inc. (“Florida Marine”).  The terms of  this contract provided that 
payment was due upon the delivery of  each completed barge.  From September 1997 
to March 2000, the barges were manufactured and delivered, while Trinity accrued 
and reported income in the taxable year when the barges were delivered. 
Upon completion of  the specified terms of  the initial contract, Trinity 
entered into a second contract with Flowers and Florida Marine to construct and 
deliver a specified number of  barges.  The second contract differed from the first in 
regards to payment terms.  Generally, each barge had a purchase price of  $1,290,000, 
of  which $1 million was to be paid upon completion and delivery, and the remaining 
$290,000 to be paid with interest within 18 months of  delivery.  Between April 2001 
and September 2002, Trinity manufactured and delivered the requisite number of  
barges.  In 2001, Trinity fully accrued the proper amount of  income from the 
delivered barges, including the deferred payments. 
In 2002, due to alleged defects discovered in barges delivered under the first 
contract, Flowers and Florida Marine withheld the deferred payments that had come 
due, instead opting to place the appropriate amounts in an escrow account to offset 
any eventual recovery of  damages resulting from the alleged defects.  From 2002-04, 
the deferred payments came due but were not remitted.  In its accounting for this 
time period, Trinity accrued only the amounts received upon delivery of  the barges 
and not the $4,520,000 of  deferred payments that were withheld by Flowers and 
Florida Marine. 
On May 15, 2002, Florida Marine filed a petition for an unspecified amount 
of  damages against Trinity.  This complaint culminated with a settlement agreement 
on March 12, 2004, whereby Trinity agreed to credit Florida Marine with the 
$2,200,000 of  unpaid deferred obligations and also to repair the defective barges 
sold under the first contract.  In exchange, Florida Marine agreed to pay Trinity the 
remaining $617,400 balance due under the second contract over a 12-month period. 
On October 7, 2002, Flowers filed a complaint against Trinity in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of  Mississippi seeking an order of  
rescission, which would require Trinity to repurchase 56 barges sold to Flowers 
under the initial contract.  On April 28, 2005, Trinity and Flowers reached a 
settlement agreement where Trinity agreed to repurchase certain barges sold to 
Flowers under the first contract and to also pay $5,764,000 in damages.  Per its 
obligation under the agreement, Flowers agreed to pay Trinity the $8,020,000 it 
withheld under the second contract.  The agreement specified that this amount was 
to be offset by the agreed-upon damages, which resulted in Flowers owing Trinity 
$2,256,000.
Upon the settlement of  the two separate complaints, a question arose 
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concerning Trinity’s accounting practices during the time period in which the 
deferred payments were withheld.  As previously stated, Trinity did not accrue the 
income from the withheld deferred payments in 2002, which resulted in a $4,250,000 
understatement of  Trinity’s 2002 consolidated income.  As a consequence of  this 
understatement, Trinity had an overstatement of  its 2002 consolidated net operating 
loss carryback, which was claimed on its consolidated return for the fiscal year 
ending March 31, 1999.  This matter was brought before the United States Tax 
Court, which held that the full contract price of  the barges delivered in 2002 should 
have been recognized as income in that year, and the withholding of  deferred 
payments under the common law claim of  offset was not justification for Trinity’s 
decision to postpone the accrual. 
Treasury Regulation § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii)(A) (2006) dictates that under the 
accrual method of  accounting, income is generally recognized when all the events 
have occurred that fix the right to receive the income and the amount of  the income 
can be determined with reasonable accuracy.  The Tax Court was not persuaded by 
Trinity’s argument that its situation fell within an exception to the general rule of  the 
accrual method, where accrual of  income may not be required if  collectability is 
doubtful or it is reasonably certain that it would not be collected at the appropriate 
time.  Trinity’s situation failed to fall within the parameters of  this exception because 
there was never an argument between the parties concerning the fact or the amount 
of  Flowers’ and Florida Marine’s obligation to Trinity under the second contract. 
Trinity’s second argument was that under § 461(f) of  the Internal Revenue 
Code, it should be allowed to deduct $4,520,000 in 2002 on the grounds that it 
“transferred” this amount to Flowers and Florida Marine to quell the damages claims 
arising from the alleged defects in barges delivered under the first contract.  The Tax 
Court disagreed with this argument and held that Trinity could not claim a deduction 
in 2002 pursuant to this section because the element of  “transfer” was not satisfied.  
The Court reasoned that for a transfer to take place, there must first be control over 
the funds or property in question.  Because Trinity never had the requisite control 
over the withheld deferred payments, the Court found that Trinity did not transfer 
money or other property in satisfaction of  Flowers’ and Florida Marine’s asserted 
liabilities.  Further, the Court determined that even if  the aforementioned 
requirement had been met, the deferred payments did not come due and therefore 
were not truly withheld from Trinity until 2003, which precluded any deduction for 
2002.
The Tax Court’s decision serves to highlight and emphasize a fundamental 
concept of  the accrual basis of  accounting.  It is imperative for companies utilizing 
this accounting method to realize that the most relevant factor in determining when 
to accrue income is the time when the “fixed right to receive” the income has been 
established, and not the time of  the actual receipt of  the payment.  The accrual 
method of  accounting is very effective, but attorneys should take special care to 
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ensure their clients are fully aware of  the importance of  distinguishing the point at 
which the “right to receive” the income has occurred.  Further, if  an attorney’s 
clients are involved in tax litigation, it is imperative that the attorney maintains 
continuous communication with the company’s CPA in order to ensure that income 
is accounted for properly throughout the litigation. 
